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RESUME
At the request of the European Parliament and some of the interests concerned, in
January 1993 the Commission asked all interested parties to participate in a
wide-ranging consultation process on the basis of the Green Paper on "Pluralism
and media concentration in the Internal Market - an assessment of the need for
Community action , Now, more than a year later, the time has come to engage in a
preliminary stock-taking exercise. This is happening at a turning point in the
history of the media sector in Europe and will contribute towards implementation
of the Commissions policy of promoting the information society, for which the
associated imperatives were set out in the White Paper on Growth
competitiveness and employment. In this respect the present communication is an
initial response to the report by the High Level Group ("BangemannGroup ) set
up by the European Council to put forward proposals on the information society.
That report higWights among other things the detrimental effects on the Internal
Market of the disparities between national rules on media ownership.
The purpose of the consultations on the Green Paper was to provide the
Commission with the information it needs if it is to adopt a position on the
sensitive issue of the need for Community rules on media ownership. The Green
Paper had identified a number of obstacles to the proper functioning of the Internal
Market caused by disparities between national rules on ownership of the media
(television, radio and the press). The purpose of these national rules is to maintain
pluralism by iimiting access to media ownership by a single person, in particular by
preventing cumulative control of, or holdings in, several media companies at once.
The Green Paper showed that these dispa~ties bring with them the risk 
restrictions on the tree movement of media services between Member States and
on the freedom of establishment of media companies, considerable legal
uncertainty, and restrictions, or distortions of competiti~n. It concluded by
proposing three options, although the Commission did not express any preference
for anyone of them at that stage. Option I consists in talcing no action at Union
level; Option IT is a recommendation aimed at facilitating the exchange of
information between Member States in the interests of transparency of media
ownership; and Option III consists in harmonizing national 'restrictions on media
ownership.
During the consultation process, which lasted over a year, opinions were received
from the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, both of
which came out in favour of Option III. The Member States were consulted and
they stressed the lack of any difficulties which might have justified Option II... 5..
The consultations afforded the opportunity above all of gathering comments from
the interests concerned, including both individual operators and the associations
representing them at European level. The consultations developed a momentum of
their own: the rate at which people made contact or sent in written comments
remained steady and positions evolved over time, T4e replies to a complementary
questionnaire sent out last summer revealed a change in the attitude of the
interests concerned, Opinions may still be divided, but a majority of operators are
now against the status quo (Option 1) and in favour of a change in the existing
regulatory framework governing media ownership. Positions are, on the other
~and, even more divergent or less explicit on the question of the level (European
or national) at which such a change should occur,
This general situation seems to be due to a number offactors:
Among the obstacles to the Internal Market identified in the Green Paper, the
consultations revealed, more particularly, that the lack of legal certainty stemming
from the current regulatory patchwork was a disincentive to investing in European
media, This limits the opportunities for media companies to make the most of the
growth potential of the Internal Market. and hence to playa more active part in
promoting pluralism.
The new political and economic environment of the "information society", the
importance of which was stressed in the Commissions White Paper on Growth,
competitiveness and empbyment. hqs added a further dirr,~nsion to the drawb&cks
caused by the lack, at Union level, of a common set of rules on media ownership,
Globalization of the media industry and the new information technologies require
that maximum use be made of the freedoms of the Internal Market in order to
facilitate the transformation of this sector into a European industry which is both
competitive and modern and which can perform to the full its essential role in the
working of our democracies, This is why the introduction of a regulatory
framework geared to the information society is one of the priority objectives of the
White Paper, and why the High Level Group s report stresses the importance of a
European approach to ending the patchwork of national rules on media ownership.
In order to adapt to this new environment, national laws on media ownership will
evolve, and indeed are already evolving, in some Member States. Globalization
and the development of the new information technologies are revealing a number
of shortcomings in national laws on media ownership and necessitate their
amendment. The prospect of such national legislative activity, uncoordinated at
Union level, is likely to accentuate the damaging effects on the Internal Market of
the disparities between national rules, foremost among which is fragmentation of the market. - 6..
Now that the European media itidustry is at a watershed, and in view of the
importance which the Commission, like Parliament, attaches to the maintenance of
pluralism, a Community initiative on media ownership might prove to be
necessary. If this were to be the case, such an initiative should enable the internal
media market to function, and in particular should facilitate the exercise of
freedom of establi!;hment for media companies and the free movement of media
services in the Union, and at the same time maintain pluralism in the face of certain
concentrations. It would provide both a maximum of legal certainty for
investments in the media sector and a safety net preventing concentrations which
represent a threat to pluralism and which cannot be dealt with under conventional
competition-law rules.
The Commission will ,laiJnch a second round of consultation with all the parties
concerned having the dual objective of:
. rejecting or confirming the need for a Community initiative;.
. in the event that such an initiative would prove necessary, define its limits- 7..
INTRODUCTION
At the request of the European Parliamene and some of the interests concerned, in
January 1993 the Commission launched a wide..ranging consultation process on the basis
of the Green Paper on "Pluralism and media concentration in the Internal Market - 
assessment of the need for Community action
By adopting the Green Paper, the Commission sought, at the same time .as providing a
basis for discussion, to stress the importance which it attaches to preserving pluralism in
the frontier-free area which is the Internal Market. The freedoms of the Internal Market
cannot be put into practice at the expense of pluralism; on the contrary, their
implementation helps to strengthen that market through the opportunities which it gives
both citizens and the media.
The purpose of the Green Paper was to assess the need for action at Community level in
the light of the disparities between national rules on media ownership. Since the middle 
the 1980s all the Member States have introduced rules on media ownership. The purpose
of these is to limit operators' freedom in order to and preserve pluralism. Four types of
provision can be distinguished:
Limits on monomedia concentration. These prevent the same person (natural or
legal) from controlling or having an interest in several media of the same type at
once, e.g. a ban on having more than " " television stations or more than "x%" of
the capital of a second station, if the operator already controls a TV station;
Limits on multimedia concentration. These prevent a single person from
controlling (or having an interest . in) several media of different types, e.g. a
newspaper company cannot control a television station, or a televisonstation
cannot control a radio station;
Limits on shareholdings in a radio or television companv which apply irrespective
of  how many other media  are controlled, e.g. in some Member States it is
impossible, even for a person who does not own any other media, to hold more
than 25% of a television station;
Limits concerning "disqualified persons These prohibit certain types of
operator or body from holding a radio or television licence or authorization, e.
some Member States lay down that public bodies, local authorities, religious or
political organizations and advertising agencies are "disqualified persons
Resolution of 15 February 1990 on media takeovers and mergers, OJ No C 68, 19.3. , pp. 137-8. Resolution of
16 September 1992 on media conceniration and diversity of opinions, OJ No C284, 1.11.92
, p.
44. 
COM(92)480 final, 23 December 1992... 8-
Having emphasized that these rules vary widely between Member States (see Annex 7)
and having analysed the impact of this diversity on the Community, the Green Paper
summed up the analysis of the question of the need for action as follows:
In the light of the objectives of the Community and of the analysis carried out here the
need for possible Community action can be described as follows:
1.  The objective of ensuring pluralism, as it is understood and pursued by the
Member States, does not as such create a need for Community intervention, The
operation of the Community is not in itself a threat to pluralism; quite the
reverse, it may have a positive effect on two factors which determine the level of
pluralism: the number of broadcasters and newspapers and the diversity of their
controllers, Member States have the legal capacity to safeguard pluralism
particularly where there is real circumvention. The only possible sources of
difficulty are tension between national authorities regarding the definition of
circumvention and questions regarding the transparency of media ownership and
control.
Among the methods used by Jl,Jember States to safeguard pluralism, the disparity
between the anti-concentration rules specific to the media constitutes an obstacle
to the functioning of the single media market:
it may result in restriction of the free movement of services where there 
circumvention
it may result in restrictions on freedom of establishment
it may prod/ice restrictio!1S0/i competition
it may distort competition
it may cause legal uncertainty regarding the question of circumvention
it limits access to media activity,
Any need for actiorr qn the part of the Community, then, has more to do with
ensuring that the Internal Market functions properly than with maintaining
pluralism as such.
For the present the obstacles are for the most part potential obstacles, because
the relevant laws are recent and the strategies adopted by operators are often still
national,
Potential obstacles can be seen mainly in broadcasting, and particularly
television broadcasting, which ha.v the highest measure of regulation. The press
is affected essentially by multimedia ownership rules rather ihan monomedia
rules.
The restrictions on media ownership which underlie the obstacles identified are
not incompatible with Community law.
The Green Paper concluded by proposing three options, without the Commission
expressing a preference for anyone of them at that stage. Option I consists in taking no
action at Union level; Option II is a recommendation aimed at facilitating the exchange
Part Four.- 9-
of information between Member States to promote transparency of media ownership; and
Option III consists in harmonizing national restrictions on media ownership,
Both: the method and the scale of the consultations were justified in view of the
importance the Commission attaches to the question of maintaining pluralism in the media
and the comple:-- ap4 sensitive nature of the issue. Equaily. in the context of the
implemetttatibn oft~e princjple of subsidiarity, a thorough approach was required to allow
the' ~eed for action and the added value of action at Union level to be accurately identified.
The specific consultations on the Green Paper have been enriched by the work and the
- report of the High Level Group of prominent persons representing the interests concemed
Bangemann Group ), set up by the European Council to put forward proposals on the
. "
information society". The rapid changes in the technological and economic environment
of 'all the media sectors inevitably throw up new topics for discussion during the
consultations. It is generally accepted that digital technology is capable of transforming all
~edia sectors by changing the economics of communication, the pattems of
interdepender;tce between sectors and the relations between the supplier of the service and
the consumer.
The results of the consultation process and consideration of the principle of subsidiarity,
notably the reality of obstacles to the freedoms of the Internal Market and the new
daqgers of fragmentation of the Internal Market created by the new rules currently being
decided separately in several Member States, lead the Commission to the conclusion that
- an iNlthltive at Community level might prove to be necessary, The Commission -believes
thaih is therefore advisable to continue the consultation process. This should, in addition
to en\iching the information already gathered by the Commission, permit the latter 
I;eJect 'or confirm the need for an initative and, in the latter caSt~, allow it to have at its
. disposal all the key factors essential for the determination of its content. This content
should be balanced and address the fundamental challenges to society posed by the
safeguarding of media pluralism.
In the interests of transparency and in view of the wealth of information gathered in the
course of the consultation process, the Commission wished to submit in this
communication an interim report informing Parliament, the Council, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of the analysis it has made of the first
round of consultation and of the follow-up it proposes.
THE CONSULTATION PROCESS
In launching the consultations, the Commission had in mind not just a formal consultation
of interested parties but to launch a genuine process with an in-built momentum featuring
a frank and open dialogue with operators. This process has led to the creation of a kind
of network of persons and operators interested in the question of pluralism and media
ownership.- 10-
Consultation method
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND
MEMBER STATES
As soon as it was adopted, the Green Paper was transmitted to Parliament and the
Council. The Commission also asked the Economic and Social Committee to deliver an
opinion on it. The consultations took place above all with the business circles concerned
the aim )eing to assess the impact on the Internal Market of the disparities between
national. rules on Fedia ownership. Over and above the tran"mission of the Green Paper
to the Council and the Member States' participation in the hearing attended by the
interested business circles. the Commission wished to deepen the consultation with the
Member States through a questionnaire on the transparency of media ownership, Only the
national authorities were capable of furnishing the Commission with information on
obstacles to the exchange of information between Member States relating to media
ownership.
The Green Paper formed the subject-matter of an exchange of views at a ministerial
. seminar in Mons on 5 October 1993, in the course of which the Ministers for Cultural
Affairs underscored the need to raise awareness among national business circles about the
consultations under way.
INTERESTS CONCERNED
twin-track consultation process  was used, consisting of consulting on the one hand the
federations and associations representing industry interests at European level, and on the
other individual operators and all other interested parties. This twin-track approach made
it possible to obtain both the common positions of European associations and federations
and individual factual contributions on the specific problems encountered by the interests
concerned.
hearing  attended by European associations and federations was held .on 26 and
27 April 1993 (list of participants attached). Only European organizations were invited
owing to space constraints but the positions of other interested parties were in any event
taken fully into account.
complementary questionnaire  was sent to all interested parties on 28 July 1993
following receipt of the preliminary reactions to, and comments on, the Green Paper. The
purpose of this questionnaire was to obtain more information on four specific points: the
impact of the new technologies, the potential development of national rules, the
real-audience criterion and the control criterion.
In addition,  numerous contacts and informal bilateral meetings  took place between the
relevant CoIIUJiission department and the interests concerned: Participation in conferences
and symposia helped increase the latter group s awareness of the need to take part in the
consultations.- 11 -
In the interests of transparency,  the written contributions received were gathered
together, except where the originator withheld permission, in five volumes which were
distributed among those who so requested. Tliese can be obtained by sending a written
request to the following address:
European Commission, DG XV/E,, , C 107 8/59, 200 rue de laLoi, B-1O49 Brussels;
fax: 32- 296 17 36.
Assessment of the consultations
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT
Numbers.  Altogether, more than 70 sets of written comments on the Green Paper and the
complementary questionnaire were received by the Commission. Of these, 25 emanated
from European federations or associations and the remainder came either from individual
operators or from national federations or private individuals.
Geographical origin.  Among the comments from interested parties other than European
industry federations, those originating in the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy were the
most numerous. Some positions were received from the Netherlands, France and Greece.
No contributions were received from operators in other Member States.
Origin by sector.  About twenty written contributions emanated more particularly from
the television sector, while !::ome ffteen posit ions 'came, from the press, six from the' radio
sector eight .tTom Jri,,:timedia operators,.- -itndfive from joumalists' federations and
employees in the media sector.
QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
(a) Momentum of the consultations
The Commission was at pains to ensure that the consultations built up and maintained a
momentum, which meant doing more than just waiting for written comments to come in.
In the event, the regular contacts between the department concerned and interested parties
and the dispatch of a complementary questionnaire helped create a dynamic which worked
well. The complementary questionnaire thus made it possible to gather positions from
operators who had not -yet submitted comments on the Green Paper as well as from those
who had. There were more new participants in the consultation process than participants
who had ceased to play the consultation game.
(b) Representativeness of the positions
With regard to the European industry federations, it is difficult to determine precisely
whether the positions accurately reflect the views of all the operators involved,
However, with regard to individual operators, the Commission notes with regret that the
bulk of the positions come from just three Member States, namely Germany, Italy and the- 12-
United Kingdom. Operators from the other Member States were disinclined to submit
formal contributions, despite the fact that some of them had established formal contact
with the C;:;ommissions departments.
(c) Quality of the information
The contributions from parties other than European associations or federations provided a
large number of specific and useful items of information, The positions of the European
associations and federations are more a reflection of compromises which sometimes
contain ambiguities or inconsistencies inherent in a collective decision-makin.g process.
The radio associations played an active part in the consultations and provided an insight
into a modern and dynamic medium.
It is important to note that many of the European federations' positions were presented at
the spring '93 hearing in a provisional form and that
, ,
in most cases, these positions have
been neither confirmed nor called into question by definitive positions. The associations
and federations have preferred instead to reply subsequently to the complementary
questionnaire and to modifY their positions through these replies without formally
confirming their initial comments or otherwise.
Lastly, the low participation rate among consumer associations is to be regretted in view
of the essential role they have to play in.this sphere.
ANALYSIS OF THE CONSULTATIONS
The results of the consultations cannot be presented in a simplified and schematic form
owing to the many nuances hesitations or distinctions which characterise the
contributions and positions of the interests concerned. Moreover, a number of
misapprehensions need to be cleared up by the Commission.
Outline .of positions
PARLIAMENT, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE
:MEMBER STATES
(a) Parliament
Parliament adopted an opinion on the Green Paper on 20 January 1994.4 It comes out in
favour of Option ill subsection c ( creation of an independent committee). 
accordingly calls on the Commission to draw up a proposal for a directive "firstly
harmonizing
OJC44, 14. 1994 p. 177.- 13 -
nationaJ restrictions on media concentration and secondly enabling the Community to
intervene in the event of concentration which ~ndangers pluralism on a European scale
(~1), It asks that an independent committee, or "European Media Council", be set up. It
provides some details as to the content of the proposal for such a directive, and calls on
the Commission to propose a directive on access to information held by national and
Community authorities and a directive safeguarding the independence of information, and
to put forward proposals concerning a European media code of conduct to maintain
professional ethics.
(b) The Economic and Social Committee
The ESC adopted an opinion on the Green Paper on 22 September  1993. It came out in
favour of Option III. Like Parliament, it calls for the drafting of a proposal for a
directive and considers sub-option C (establishment of an independent committee) to be
both reasonable and effective" (~4:7).
(c) The Member States
The specific questionnaire sent to the Member States in July 1993 has shown that there is
no need that justifies Option II becau&eat the present time there are no real difficulties
in exchanging information relating to the transparency of media ownership. As regards the
choice between Options I and HI, Member States took a waiting positiol1-, not wanting, so
it seems, to take up a positio~l at trig stage bptore know;;;g t1:e re!w1ts oithe c")nsldtations
:th the inierests coni..~erneci, , , -i. Member Sta~e V\.' :..ed to s: ,-~e its p'
., ,"
don on ;ic
options in the Green Paper in wnting,
THE INTERESTS CONCERNED
Generally speaking the industry s position can be stated as follows:  the current national
rules on media ownership must chan2e. in particular so as to cope with 210balization
and the impact of the new technol02ies. On the other hand. the auestion of the
level- national or European - at which the chan2e' must occur is the, subject of
va2ue or divided positions. This is due to the fact that those in the industry hesitate to
take a position on this question without knowing the exact content of the rules. Some of
them had the impression that the Commission was asking them to sign a "blank cheque
This position emerged recently when the complementary questionnaire was being
answered.
In view of the complexity of the posed questions, the diversity of the interests concerned
and subtle variations between the comments. it is not possible to distinguish between and
regroup the various positions according to the names of the originators,  Dividing
OJ C 304 10.11.1993, p. 17.- 14-
lines have, however. shown up clearly according to the type of operator concerned. Five
dividing lines are clearly visible in the i~dustry, depending on the operators concerned:
(a) According to the scope of the operators strategy:
strategy/national strategy
European
Those .operators who , have .a strategy of establishment (acquisition .of holdings in, or
control of: media cpmpanies) in t~e different Member States are t~e first t~ .be interested
in a common rule ot)he game in the Cominunity which is both fiXed and stable and which
offers the legal essential to i~lVe~tment in this sector, where the risks mId cost of access are
already particularly high, On the other ~and, those operators who have a strategy of
estabJishment in their national 'market are less interested in a common rule except if
they are adversely affected by distortions of competition (see below).
(b) According to the operators
activities/multimedia activities
activities: monomedia press
Some operators who have a 1110nomedia press s~ategy can see no point in Community
action in so far as they are not victims of tpe disparities between laws on media
ownership. Only France and Italy' have specific rules limiting monomedia concentration by
means of "mechanical" thresholds. Because such rules' do not exist in the other
Member States, th~effi:'(:ts. 0f t~~ .disparities are less important than in the case of
multimedia activities or i11onomedia broadca:,:tiog cOncentration. By contrast, multimedia
operators (or monomedia TV '~di-~dio operatOrs) are more favourably disposed towards
Community intervention because they may cume up against the effects of the disparities
between the rides that have been introduced in aU Member States.
(c) According to the operators' origin: open market/closed market
Operators carrying on activities in a country where the rules on ownership are liberal are
sometimes worried that investors might concentrate on their market rather than go to
other countries where access to ownership is less liberal. The best-known example, which
predates the Green Paper, is that of the British television company ITV, which voiced
these fears in view of the fact that in the United Kingdom a single operator may have
100% of the capital of an !TV station whereas in other Member St~tes holdings are
limited to a maximum of25% (as in Greece or Spain) or to less than 50% (as in Germany
and, since recently. in France).
(d) According to the operators' experience: new entrants/established operators
New entrants have an obvious interest compared with established operators. The latter
have had to find their feet in a r~cently ~nacted national regulatory environment and are
therefore sometimeS unfavourably disposed towards any action which might destabilise it.
By contrast, new entrants who wish to invest in the media sector with an industrial- 15-
approach wish to have .a legal framework which liberalizes market access and removes the
legal uncertainty of the current regulatory patchwork. Thus, certain established media
operators have expressed concern at the entry into the media market of the large
telecommunications companies,
(e) According to the duration of a strategy:
strategy
short:tenn strategyllong-term
The consultations also revealed a difference between companies with a long-term strategy
and those with only a short-term strategy or no strategy at all. The latter are sometimes
tempted to prefer the status quo to a Community initiative. By contrast, operators who
have a long-term strategy are on the whole in favour of such an initiative inasmuch as they
view the Internal Market more as an opportunity than a threat.
Analvsis of the answers to theauestionnaires
ANSWERS RELATING TO THE NEED FOR ACTION
At issue here are the answers to questions 1 to 3 and 5 of the Green Paper questionnaire
(a) Protection  uf  pluralism
As  regards the safeguarding of pluralism  as such, Parliament, the Economic and Social
Committee, the journalists' federations and the trade unions said there was a risk that
pluralism might be affected and that this justified action at European level. Parliament, in
particular, in its resolution of 20 January 1994, considers "that national media legislation
alone was no longer sufficient to safeguard diversity of opinion and pluralism in Europe
(recital A); that "media concentration and cross-ownership are increasing in the
Community (and that) once established, such cross-ownership, where it reduces diversity
of opinion, is difficult to reverse" (recital C) and, lastly, that "there is a need
QUESTION 1:" The Commission wouid welcome.tlie views  of  interested parties regarding tbe need for action, and in
particularon: "
' .
any cases ':'here , the' Community 'dimension  of  medii!. activity h;!S meant that restrictions on media ownership
imposed for tlie' purpose of maintaining pluralism have become ineffective, for example because they are
circumvented 'or because oflransparency problems;
the existence  of  restrictions or r(strictive' effects other than those identifi~ here;
practical instances where ownership ieStrictions have actually impeded' the activity or'econoJ11ic operators in the seCtor, 
' ' , 
the sectorS and activities which are espCQially affected by restrictions on ownership (for  example, is the press subject
to restrictive effects not only in. respect  of  multiJlledia ;!Spects. but al~ in respect oCmonomedia ;!Spects?).
Q1.!ESTION 2: The Commission' would welcome the views  of  interested parties on whether tlie needs identified
are  of  sufficient importance, in the light  of  Community obj~ives, to require action in the media industry and. ifso
, when .such action should be taken. QUESTION 3: The Commission would welcome the views  of  interested
parties on the effectiveness , in the light  of  Community objectives of  action which would be taken so1ely at
Member State . level. QUESTION 5:, ,The Commission would w~lcome the vieWs' of interested parties on the
desirability  of  action to promote trarisparency which would be  sep~te f%om a harmonization inStiuiQent - 16-
to harmonize national legislation which imposes restrictions on the media in order firstly
to prevent them being evaded and secondly to safeguard the operation of the Internal
Market. thereby at the same time increasing the competitiveness of the European media
(recital E),
(b) Transparency of media ownership
Action relating to transparency  separate ftom rules on media ownership (Option IT) IS
rejected by Parliament and the ESC, which consider that both types of measure should be
dealt with together. Opinions among the interests concerned are more divided: those who
are hesitant about, or against, rules on media ownership tend to support action in relation
to transparency, whereas those who are in favour of Option III are opposed to such
action. An independent national supervisory authority .came out in favour of Option II.
The answers to the questionnaire sent to the Member States in July 1993 generally'
indicate that for the time being there are no obstacles to the exchange of information.
Those who are in favour of Option II sometimes understood this option as covering all
problems of transparency, including the quality and effectiveness of national rules
whereas in fact it concerned only the question of the exchange of information relating to
transparency. 7
(c) Reality of the obstacles to the Internal Market identified in the Green Paper
At the end of a legal analysis, the Green Paper specifies that the Member States may
.. legitimately, in certain cases, take measures limiting the application of the principles of the
Internal Market in order to preserve pluralism - an objective of public interest. Thus, a
number of obstacles to the functioning of the Internal Market are identified: television
channels freedom to tetran~it  (Article 59) between Member States may be restricted in
the event of a genuine circumvention of the legislation on media ownership, and media
companies right of estabUshment  (Article 52) in the Member States may be restricted. 
addition, it is possible for there to be  distorsions and restrictions of competition; legal
uncertainty  may discourage investment and damage the competitiveness of media
enterprises; lastly, in a general way,  access to media activities  may be limited, The
consultation process, which lasted over a year, showed that the obstacles were real.
Part Four, Chapter 5, ~II If there were really a need with regard to transparency, this would be to make it easier for
information to be gathered and exchanged between the authorities concerned by means of a legal obligation on media
enterprises to disclose information (so that. where appropriate, controlling interests can be identified) and on the
competent authorities to communicate information to other authorities. For this purpose a recommendation could be
proposed or. ifnecessary, a legal instrument.
...... e." 17 -
(i) The disparity of the rules discourages direct investment in media enterprises arid
the exercise of the right of establishment
The consultations demonstrated that the obstacles to the Internal Market show up in
decisions not to make .any direct investments, i.e, not to set up, or take a stake in, a media
company. Setting up a media enterprise - be it a new company, a subsidiary, a
restructuring operation, acquisition of control or a merger - is a project which takes time
and carries risk since everything depends ultimately on. an authorization being given by a
national authority. Thus, the obstacle becomes tangible more as the result of a process
that culminates in a decision not to invest in in an establishment project than in the shape
of a decision by a competent authority not to grant a licence, thereby giving rise to a
formal dispute.
This observation is confirmed by two phenomena: first, the undercapitalization of media
companies in certain Member States or the difficulties they have in raising capital
(problems of finding new shareholders, or conflicts between shareholders) and, second
the recent investments by European operators in non"European markets (operators
reported that since there was no genuine Internal Market for the media they preferred to
invest on the American market or in the new markets of Asia). The economic analysis in
the Green Paper, which drew on a study by a consultant, had already shown that direct
investments between Member States in media companies are fairly limited, apart from in
the magazine sector, which is in fact not covered by the rules on media ownership.
. The disparities between national rules act as a deterrent for two reasons:
Disparities give rise to legal uncertainty about the legitimacy of any national
measure rejecting licence applications on account of shareholdings in or control 
media in the other Member States. The legality for the purposes of Community
law of such a measure, which has been foreseen under several national legislations
would have to be examined in the light of its proportionality to the objective
pursued. The result of such a scrutiny is very risky and uncertain. The uncertainty
. is furthermore accentuated by the fact that the rules on media ownership
sometimes vague which is the source of conflicts, as for instance those in Germany
over the definition of controller (disputes between two Lander authorities) and in
France (purchase of the newspaper Demieres Nouvelles d'Alsace). Legislative
disparities and legal uncertainty mean that setting up a new media enterprise will
entail search costs. This is not a negligible item, especially for ~mall media ventures
such as radio stations. Contacts with lawyers, e.g. at conferences and seminars on
the Green Paper, confirm that operators commission research at substantial costin
addition to the usual market research.- 18 -
The disparities between national systems of law produces  restrictions of
competition  and induce operators to engage in "forum shopping" - identifying
investment prospects more in terms of the national legislative framework than in
terms of market opportunities. Operators have stressed that this can lead to
investment decisions which are inefficient or conclude not to invest at all. Some
national markets are thus "protected" from new competitors, which facilitates
mergers between operators already there. The argument that the latter are subject
to the same restrictive rules as those who want to gain access to the market is not
relevant, since the operators already there have the advantage of having had time
to become established and to influence the legal framework ("fief' effect).
(ii) Disparities create legal uncertainty about the free movement of broadcasts
The Green Paper analysed the question of circumvention at length and concluded that the
Member States could legitimately restrict the free movement of a channel which
circumvents legislation on media ownership (by broadcasting, for instance, via satellite
from another Member State) if the measure were proportionate to the objective of
pluralism. Through this condition of proportionality, which requires an examination of
each individual case, the Green Paper recognized the importance of the grey area of leg~l
uncertainty which exists to distinguish genuine circumvention from the action of an
operator who is only using the opportunities of the Internal Market.
The consultations showed that circumvention of rules in a way which threatened pluralism
was regarded as a plausible scenario in particular by Parliament. even if for the moment
there had been no ' clear instance of it. On the other hand, some operators seem
preoccupied by the possibility that a Member State might invoke the circumvention
argument in the case of activities which did not constitute one. In this respect, it should be
noted that in the case of infringement proceedings the objective of pluralism has been used
several times by the Member States to justifY measures limiting the free movement of
television broadcasts or the frt:edom E)f establishment. The national measures in question
in these cases did not, however, involve rules on pluralism and "media ownership. A
fortiori, this means that the risk of the rules on media ownersQip "being invoked by 
Member State to challenge a broadcast from another Member State will increase as
cross-border activities expand.
(m) Disparities e~pose operators to distortions of competition
Already back in 1992, the UK television channel !TV formally drew the
Commissions attention to the distorting effects of the disparities between the rules
on media ownership.- 19-
Various operators reported that the difference between their national rules and
those of the other Member States made, it hard for them to compete against media
enterprises ftom other Member States which had been able to grow under fewer
constraints.
During the consultations operators expressed fears about ftagmented
liberalization at Community level, i.e. only in their Member State. This could have
the result of exposing them to competition ftom large groups ftom other Member
States or non-member countries which were attracted by the national market thus
liberalized. In this respect media operators were worried about
telecommunications operators, who were preparing, in the context of the
information society, to enter the media market .and who would be the first to be
interested in liberalization by a Member State acting alone.
(iv) The opportunities afforded by the new technologies and the Internal Market
cannot be fully used within the current legal framework
This was the virtually unanimous conclusion of all operators: at a time when the new
technologies (digital transmission, compression and convergence) make it possible and
essential to cross, national ftontiers. the current legalftamework is inappropriate. The
rules were drawn up at a time whenftequencies were scarce, whereas, ftom now on,
digital technology will increase the technical capacity to create new channels (by a factor
of between 6 and 10). The inappropriateness arises not only out of the nature of the
national rules but also ftom the disparity in national approach, for the investment needed
to implement these new technologies requires that markets be found at Community level.
It is not enough therefore for one Member State alone to adapt its rules, because an
operator established there would encounter obstacles when exporting the new media
services to other Member States whose legislation on media ownership did not offer the
. same opportunities.
One of the strategies cited most by operators consists 'in  broadcasting a bundle of
specialized channels (made possible by digital compression) to a small target audience; 
be profitable, this must have a cross-border dimension, While these clusters could be
lawful in certain Member States, they would not be in others whose legislation restricts
the number of channels. Legally, the outcome of any dispute that might arise is very
uncertain. for an assessment would have to be made in each case of whether, given the
principle of proportionality, a Member State can legitimately. restrict such broadcasts.
Another example of the uncertainty of the current legal ftamework which could cause
problems for cross-border broadcasting lies in the definition of the televised media (are
electronic newspap~rs covered by the current rules?) or in the application of ceilings to
shareholdings in a television channel.20-
(v) The new technologies and the legislative reactions to them will increase the
significance of the obstacles to the Internal Market in the short term
The consultations showed that as a result of the new technologies, operators are now
thinking in terms of the new media and new European markets to make their exploitation
profitable, In this respect, the obstacles to the Internal Market will have a quite different
effect in the very short term:
the expansion of cross-border media activities as a result of the new technologies
increases the risk of conflicts or disputes arising out of the disp,1.rities between
national rules;
the obstacles to the Internal Market could become even more important since,
faced with the new technologies, national rules are changing and may become even
more disparate. In Germany, the competent authorities in the Lander have started
work on the revision of the ownership rules in the "Rundfunkstaatsvertrag ; in
Belgium, a debate has been launched on the impact of digital technology; in
France, a new law has now liberalized the rules on the maximum shareholding in a
television company, and a report by the Conseil Superieur de I'Audiovisuel (CSA)
proposes that the anti-concentration rules be amended~ in Italy, there has been a
public debate about media ownership for some years; in the Netherlands, a code of
conduct has just been drawn up to limit monomedia concentration in the press; and
in the United Kingdom a review of the rules on multimedia ownership has been
launched with a view to. their liberalization. With these developments in the
national rules there is a real risk that national approaches will become even more
disparate if there is no coordination at Community level. Such disparity is already
apparent with regard to the general objective: in some Member States (e.g. the
United Kingdom or France), the changes are intended to liberalize the current
framework in order to face up to world competition, whereas in other Member
States (Germany or the Netherlands) the debate focuses more on increasing the
effectiveness of supervision. Another cause of this disparity is that the starting
point for these changes varies considerably since cu~nt rules and national
markets are already very dissimilar. Without a Community framework for these
legislative developments, therefore, there is no chance that a natural alignment
between national rules will occur;
lastly, faced with the globalization of the media industry, European media
companies' will not be sufficiently competitive on the international scene if they
cannot exploit the opportunities for development provided by the Internal Market.
(d) The quality of national rules
rhe  quality of national rules  on media ownership was often criticised, in particular to
lraw attention to the need to facilitate access by operators to media activities.- 21 -
The radio sector, in particular, underscored this aspect in view of the difficulty of
obtaining authorisations or licences. This question reveals the existence of pressure to
bring about changes in national regulatory frameworks.
(e) Competitiveness of the industry
The  importance  of the objective of promoting the industry s competitiveness, in assessing
the need for action, was stressed, in particular by publishers and multimedia operators
owing to the globalization of the media industry and the development of new
technologies.
ANSWERS RELATING TO THE CONTENT OF ANY ACTION
At issue here are the answers to questions 4 and 6 of the Green Paper questionnaire and
to questions C and D of the complementary questionnaire.
8 The question of the content of
any action was both omnipresent in the positions voiced and paradoxically treated with
little precision and substance in the contributions received. Many participants in the
consultation process tended to link the question of the need for action to that of the
content of such action, whereas they are two separate questions which can be answered
separately.
The  setting-up of a European committee  was called for by Parliament and the ESC, but
on the other hand is objected to by a majority of the business interests concerned.
The question of the coverage of monomedia press concentration,  The consultations
revealed, on the one hand, that operators in two countries (F, I) with an automatic
QUESTION 4: The Commission would welcome the views of interested parties on the.~ of a possible harmonization
instrument as envisaged above, and in particular on the two variants for its  on the use of the  real audience as a basis for
setting thresholds, on the demarcation of distribution areas. on any  other Dossible references. and on ways of defining the
concept of controller. QUESTION 6: The Commission would welcome the views of interested parties on the desirability of
setting up a body with competence for media concentration. QUESTION Ct. Given that a criterion of potential audience
(like the population covered bya satellite footprint) would be too restrictive, what type of audience measurement might be
utilised, in particular for multimedia anumonomedia concentration of radio and television enterpriSes (fos example, "audience
share" for television, "daily reach" for radio, number of dailies sold for newspapers)? Question C2. With reference to criteria
used in national arenas, namely the number of channels, will the audience criterion offer more opportunities to aa:ess the
market, namely for thematic (i.e. special-interest) channels (by reason of their small audience)? Question eJ. What might the
necessary conditions be to make a system using Ihresholdsbased on audience levels workable (compatibility, comparability,
equivalence, etc.)? Is it possible to have a single audience criterion applicable to multimedia or is it necessary to have several
distinct criteria applicable to each medium or combinations of media? Question C4. Might it be deemed necessary to have
complementary criteria such as, for example, that of language of the media, that of the type of radio station or TV channel
concerned, that of the number oflicences granted at the same time, etc.? Question CS, Should the fixing oflhresholds leave a
discretion to the Member States to set stricter limits for operators establisbed on their territory? Question 01. Is it necessary
to go further than existing company law to define media control in specific roles? Question D2. What comments can be made
on the definitions used for media controllers in current national regulations? Question D3. What elements should a definition
contain bearing in mind the objectives of effectiveness, adaptability to the Community ftamework, and compatibility with
existing systems as well as the economic and technological effects that could result?22 -
limit on monomedhi press concentration wished to be no longer discriminated against
compared with the other Member States which have no such limits and, on the other, that
operators in the other Member States were opposed to the extension of this type of limit
in their country.
The  audience criterion  envisaged in the Green Paper was commented on several times in
fairly general terms. Three points of view were expressed: it is a logical criterion but one
which poses problems of feasibility; it is an inadequate criterion which needs to 
accompanied by economic criteria (such as revenue); it is not a good criterion, The
majority of conrinents fell into the first two categories. The question whether a single,
integrated multimedia criterion can be used was answered in a variety of ways. It should
be noted that the audience criterion gave rise to misunderstandings and that, in the
intervening period between the answers to the Green Paper questionnaire and those to the
complementary questionnaire, positions evolved, the criterion being viewed in a more
favourable light. Some operators were under the mistaken impression that the criterion
might penalise the growth of an existing television channel, whereas in fact it would be
used only in the context of an application, to a national authority, for authorisation to set
up a new channel or to take over (or acquire a shareholding in) an existing channel.
The  media controller criterion  also envisaged in the Green Paper
1o was the subject of very
few specific comments. However, the majority of contributions stressed that it would be
necessary to lay down specific rules which go further than existing company law in
defining control.
The question of  persons ineligible for media ownership  (disqualified persons) was
considered important by Parliament, which asks, in particular, that advertising agencies
should not be allowed to run qewspapers or radio or television companies and vice versa.
The Green Paper envisages using the audience criterion for setting restriction thresholds limiting access to media ownership: in
order to award aliL'enSe to a new television channel ( or to authorise the acquisition of control of an existing television
channel). The national controlling authorities should detennine if the media audience already controlled by the applicant for a
license does nol exceed the threshold fixed by the directive, for the broadcasting zone of the new channel.
It is a queo;tion of flDding a definition that allows the person or operator controlling a media enterprise to be idenlified in order
to apply the audience criterion limiting access to ownership.- 23-
ANSWERS RELATING TO THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES
At issue here are the answers to question A of the complementary questionnaire,
All the answers stress the sizeable impact of the new technologies, in particular
digitalization, compression and convergence, which will make it possible to increase the
number of television channels, appreciably modify commercial strategies and increase
globalization. The positions stress that the CUITent rules on media ownership are
unsuitable owing, especially, to the methods they use, in particular the criterion of the
number of channels .controlled by a single operator, or the definitions of broadcasting
(does it cover electronic publishing?). The contributions also stress the importance of new
technologies for the publishing sector. Some operators in the radio .sector raised the
problem of access to technologies, in particular DAB (Digital Audio Broadcasting), and
stressed the risk of further concentration which they involve. Other positions, on the other
hand, point to the need to increase the flexibility of the anti-concentration thresholds to
the extent necessary for the development of the new broadcasting technologies. Some
questions deserve to be examined more thoroughly, such as those related to the economic
ties of the media operator both upstream and downstream and those concerning the
pattern of vertical integration. 
ANSWERS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL RULES
At issue here are the answers to question B of the complementary questionnaire. 12 In
general, the answers mentioned the existence of regulatory or pre-regulatory 
Question AI: IdentifY the new technologies or those under expansion which will affect the m~et (distinguishing namely
between those which, from the point of view of the consumer, will replace existing technology and those which will be of a
more complementary nature, giving details of the expected time scale for implementation of these technologies). Question A2:
What economic impacts will be foreseeable at the Community level, in particular on the market structure and on the strategy of
operators within the internal market? This evaluation will not have to be all-encompassing but should be carried out on a
technology-by-technology b;lSis. It is important to give precise infonnation about the access costs to these technologies, in
particular for the consumer and the opernors. Question A3: What impacts will be foreseeable on the national statutory arena
in regard to media ownership? Does current national legislation covering media ownership pennit, or, on the contrary, limit,
the development of these new technologies (explain the effect of any limitations)? Question A4: To what de~ could the new
technologies develop conditions for the granting of authorizations or licences applicable to television or nulio operators? 
particular, which conditions, besides those relating to pluralism, could be envisaged?
Question 81: Are you aware of any proposals for new anti-concentration rules, in the Member States, specific to the media?
What is "their origin and objective? Question B2: Would you welcome a change in the applicable regulatory ftamework?
Question B3: What factors could change the national regulatory fuunework in the future (new broadcaster authorisations, case
law developments, political debates, ineffectiveness of national rules, over-stringent rules, etc.)? Question B4: How long did it
take to draw up the curnnt regulations and were you involved in the process? Question BS: Could these possible changes
accentuate or attenuate the regulatory disparity between the Member States of the Community?- 24-
activity in several Member States, and a number of positions stressed the risks of an
increase in the disparities between national rules.
Observations on the comments
The consultations revealed a number of misapprehensions which need to be cleared up,
THE SCOPE OF ANY ACTION
(a) Questions relating to access to information and the exercise of journalistic
activities 
In its position Parliament asked the Commission to propose certain other measures apart
from those on media concentration, namely a directive on access to information held by
national and Community authorities, a directive safeguarding editorial independence, and a
code of conduct on professional ethics, The Commission would point out in this
connection that the questions dealt with .in the Green Paper were defined in the light of the
Community' s competences and the principle ofsubsidiarity.
As regards the request for a  directive on acce$$ to information held by national and
Community authoritie$ the Commission acknowledges that the questions oftransp~rency
and acc,~ss to info!mation arc importanJ:. It was vlith this in mind that it presented two
communications tG the Council, Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, one
" on transparency in the Community,13 and the other on public access to the institutions
documents,14 These two communications underline the Commission s concern to
implement a policy .0f tr:ansparency at' the level of the Union s institutions, especially by
means of an interinstit~tionarigreement They do not, however, tackle the issue of access
to information in the Member States in so far as such matters are already dealt with at
national level in accordance with approaches specific to each Member State. In this
context, regulatory intervention at Union level is not justified in the light of the Internal
Market as the disparities between national rules on these questions do not create obstacles
which ought to be removed by harmonization.
As regards the  media code of conduct on professional ethics  and the  framework directive
safeguarding journalistic and editorial independence in view of the Community'
competences .and the principle of subsidiarity these matters cannot be dealt with 
Community level but are a matter for the Member States In the first place, such questions
are not always dealt with by regulatory means, being instead governed by
COM(93) 258 fmal, 2 June 1993.
COM(93) 191 final, 5 May 1993.- 25 -
codes of ethics which do not concern the legislator, and in the second place, where
statutory rules do  ey,ist the differences between Member States do not seem to cause any
problems for the jimctioning of the Internal Market such .as would justifY their
harmonization.
(b) Question,. i dating to internal pluralism
The question of internal pluralism has given rise to a number of misunderstandings which
have led to several requests being made that public channels be excluded ffom the scope
of a possible directive on media ownership. This is a sensitive issue and the Commission is
of the opinion that the specifi c nature of public channels must be taken fully into account
in determining the content of any rules, However, any automatic or  a p-riori derogation
would requ~re an in"depth analysis along the following lines:
First of all, a partial harmonization, i.e. a harmonization which would not cover all cases
of concentration, might not remove the obstacles to the Internal Market created by the
disparities between national rules.
Secondly, if the content of the directive prevents media concentrations above a certain
level, all cases of concentration must be covered, including those involving public
channels, in which case their public service missions should however be taken into
account.
Thirdly, public channels sometimes behave like private operators when implementing a
diversification strategy which could lead to, for example, the creation of new channels
which are not subject to the same public channel internal pluralism obligations.
Fourthly, the interests at stake must not be confused: harmonization of regulations on
media ownership would not in any way call into question the specific characteristics of
public broadcasters, including their public service and internal pluralism obligations.
Lastly, th~re is no substitutability between internal pluralism measures and external
pluralism measures: although the general objective is the same, namely to ensure
pluralism, the specific objective pursued by these two types of measure in attaining the
general objective is different: internal pluralism measures seek to ensure diversity 
opinion wit!-in a channel's programmes; external pluralism measures seek to ensure
diversity .of opinion, not within a channel's programmes, but through the independence and
autonomy of the different media offered to the public. It is thus not possible to offset any
non-application of external pluralism measures by the application of internal pluralism
measures.- 26-
(c) The question of the interface between general competition law and the
specific rules on media ownership
Some comments expressed doubts about the interface between the specific rules on media
o'.vnership a:. .l generall..;ompetition law.
(i) Impossibility of replacing the specific rules on media ownership with general
co:npetition law
As stated in the Gree~1 Paper
15 . even if competition law C1tn contribute to pluralism, 
cannot cover every situation because the maintenance of competition and the maintenance
of pluralism arc two different objectives which call for different assessments, That is why
the Member States have adopted specific rules on media ownership in parallel with
domestic competition law.
Moreover however effective competition law may be the disparities between specific
national rules on media ownership remain as does their impact on the functioning of the
Internal Market.
Reducing the thresholds in the Merger Control Regulation 16 
which has sometimes been
put forward as a solution, would therefore not solve the problems created by the
disparities between specific national rules on media ownership.
(ii) Risk oJ overlap with competition law
Conversely, .some comments seem to call for a specific rule covering situations which fall
more under the sphere of competition law. This is the case in particular with
concentration in the advertising industry Or with the vertical relationship between a
producer and a right-holder, which can be dealt with by applying national or Community
competition law (Merger Control Regtilation, Articles 85 and 86 oft~e Treaty) without
Part Four, Chapter II, Section I, Subsection 2. Because of the different nature of the two instruments ( competition law!
specific rules relating to the media), situations could exist in which pluralism might be threatened without actual competition
being hampered in a significant way in the Internal Market or a substantial portion ofil This could result ftom the definition of
the markets in question which makes it difficult to take a internal market for multi media activities into account and lends ~If
to a separate exammati(ln (lfeach market in question. For example, ftom the media consumer's point of view, who listens to the
radio, reads a newspaper and watches television, a multi media concentration oould mean that aU the media he receives are
under the control of the same controller, even if the sections (If the media markets C()ntrolled by that same person in each of the
markets in questi(ln are not large enough to hamper oompetition.
In this COlU1ectiOn, the Commission decided, in its July 1993 repmt on the application of the Merger Control Regulation, to
wait bef(lre making a pr(lposal to revise the tbresh(llds. The matter will be considered before the end of 1996.27 -
it being necessary to draw up new, specific rules, Similarly, the ~ffective application of
competition law can cover situations relating to .systems for controlling access to the new
technologies (encryption) which could limit acCess by certain firms to the new media
market This is Lt1cidentally why, at national level, the specific domestic rules on pluralism
do not generally cover this type of situation,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET AND
SAFEGUARDING OF PLURALISM
THE
On a number of occasions in the course of the consultations several participants seemed to
draw a contrast between the objective of completing the Internal Market and that 
safeguarding pluralism. In the Commissions view, such a contrast is not justified, The
Internal Market is not a "free market" in which aU restrictions are to be removed.
Indeed, the Green Paper emphasises that the national rules are persue an essential general
interest (to guarantee pluralism) and therefore only a community harmonization of these
general-interest rules could put an end to the restrictions caused by their disparities on the
free movement of services and the freedom of est~blishment.
Therefore, in so far as the proper functioning of the Internal Market calls for.a set of rules
these would at the same time seek to maintain pluralism in the face of media
concentration. In other words, Community intervention based on the establishment and
functioning of the Internal Market is not in itself contrary to the general interest
requirement of preventing concentrations which endanger pluralism which cannot be
covered by the application of competition law alone.
LIBERALIZATiON" EFFECT OF RULES ON PLURALISM
Some participants in the consultat"ion process expressed doubts about the possibility of
liberalizing anti-concentration systems using rules on pluralism However. there is no
contradiction between regulation and liberalization, On the contrary, only a set 
Community rules would .permit, where appropriate, a certain type of liberalization. There
are three reasons for this:
- it would  reduce the number of rules confronting operators in their European aCtivities
(by replacing 12 different sets oflegal provisions with a single set);
- it would  remove the obstacles to the Internal Market identified above (in particular the
lack of legal certainty in the event of circumvention of the law) by removing the
disparities between laws;28 -
- the third reason concerns not the Community added value peculiar to any "Internal
Market"-type harmonization, but the  quality of the content of the legal instrument. The
task here will be, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, to define a content
which does not go beyond what is necessary in terms of the objective ~obe attained and
which strikes a delicate balance between the need to facilitate access to media activities
and the need to prevent pluralism-threatening concentrations which cannot be stopped
solely by applying competition law. The effectiveness of competition law will need to be
taken into account when it comes to determining the content and liberalizing effect of a
regulationsince the object of the rules would be to cover only situations which are
dangerous from the point of view of pluralism and which cannot be covered by
competition law. Other situations, by contrast, would be covered only by general
competition law. An instrument which caused confusion or created an overlap between
competition law and the specific rules would prevent genuine liberalization without
providing a better gu'U'antee of pluralism. Moreover, the quality of the rules will depend
on the ability to take into account the context of the new technologies. In this respect,
the use of the audience criterion would, in the Commissions view, be likely to safeguard
the maintenance: of pluralism more effectively while being less harsh than the criterion 
the number of channels owned by the same operator.
ANALYSIS OF THE OPTIONS FOLLOWING THE FIRST ROUND OF
CONSUL TA TION
A. Commission position on the options
Overall, the consultations confirmed the analysis, which identified the obstacles toa
Internal Market and the ihree possible options. It is not the purpose of this
communication, therefore, to pinpoint the potential obstacles again, and the reader 
referred to the Green Paper for a fuller explanation. A potential need for action has been
identified. but a final decision as to that need, i.e. concerning in this case one or other of
the options, has to be assessed for its appropriateness.. In this particular case, given the
specific characteristics of the question involved, the Commission has assessed the various
possible options on the basis of four criteria: which option' best lends itself to the
achievement of the Community's objectives (teleological criterion)? Which option is best
suited to the prospect of change (diachronic criterion)? What is the impact of the options
(impact criterion)? And which option is most consistent with 'the other Community
initiatives (consistel1cy criterion)?
OPTiON I (NO ACTION BY THE COMMUNITY)
(a) Achieving the Community objectives
If the Commission were to take no action, the objectives of the Internal Market would not
be achieved in the media sectors. The obstacles to the functioning of the Internai Market- 29-
which were identified in the Green Paper, in particular the lack of legal certainty as to the
tree movement of services and the fte~dom of establishment, would persist and could not
be removed by other types of measure, Option I would mean that the status quo
concerning access to media ownership would be acceptable for the pIJrposes of the
Internal Market.
(b) Prospects for change
The legal systems of the Member States are currently distinguished by substantial but
contrasting legislative trends. Whereas in France and the United Kingdom there is a
tend~cy towards liberalization, in the Netherlands there are stricter rules (a professional
code of ethics was recently adopted setting traditional limits on monomedia concentration
in the press), and the question is the subject of debate in Germany and Italy.
It is difficult to see how such trends can lead spontaneously to the  de facto approximation
of national rules if there is no institutional ftamework at Community level. The political
and economic context specific to each national system will mean that legislative trends will
be driven by a specific logic, One need only look, for instance, at how the question of
multimedia concentration is treated in the different countries.
It should be noted that this rule-making activity is set to increase further. There are two
reasons for this. First, the traditional definitions relating to television activities and the
quantitative criterion of the number of channels controlled by a single operator (laid down
in the fi'ies in orr'. :' to limit ;nedia coL.mtratiop) :;fe unsuit:d to the ~-~w CO:.1tf:-:: of a
multiplk;ity of channels (new technologies) and ar~ going to lead, in the short or medium
term, to changes;'n' the legislation. Secondly, thw impleme;1tation of operators' global
strategies. arid in particular the entry of telecommunications operators in the market, will
result either in a demand for liberalization by traditional media operators already in the
market or, conversely, in pressure for these new situations to be regulated.
(c) The impact of not taking action
Political impact,  A decision not to take action would run counter to the wishes clearly
expressed by Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. This could have
repercussions on the relations between Parliament and the Commission or the Council in
future matters relating to the media, particularly as regards the follow-up to the White
Paper. Not to take action would also run counter to the concerns expressed in the report
of the High Level Group, which asks the. Commission to react to the current situation
regarding media ownership and to the possibility that it might deteriorate. Failure to take
action would be interpreted by the industry as a sign that the Community does not intend- 30-
to formulate a public policy of encouraging direct investment in the media sector. At
Member State level, a decision to take no action could, possibly, accord with the wishes
of some national authorities, who might be reluctant to ,see the Community intervene in a
sensitive area. However, if no action is taken, the expansion of the media s .cross-border
activities could increase the risk of tension between the national authorities responsible for
granting licences or authorisations. Political pressure at national level to take measures
concerning media concentration would also markedly increase.
The  economic impact  of a decision not to take action can be assessed in accordance with
two possible short-term scenarios: (a) ffagmented liberalization, i,e, in one or a few
Member States only, and (b) the maintenance of the status quo or the intensification of
national restrictions.
On the supply side irrespective of the scenario, the ffagmentation and
compartmentalisation of markets, and the resultant lack of legal certainty would have tJ'te .
general effect of discouraging investment, from within the Union and outside, in the
European media and would reduce the competitiveness of the European media industry in
the context of the increasing globalization of the sector.
In the event of fragmented liberalization the Member States liberalizing access to media
ownership could receive
, '
in the short term a considerable flow of investment ffom
operators in third co:Jntries or other Member States which ha ,,:e not liberalized their
system. Depending or. its scale, such investJl'1'::nt could, by reactio'l, encourag~ the COU!ilry
concerned to reintroduce regulatory barriers in the medium tenn. Even if the flow of
investment were massive, it would still be less than if liberalization were carried out at
Union level, since tht'. liberalized national market would not be large enough for launching
new, innovative services..-Liberalization with a view to promoting the creation of
information highways by allowing telecommunications operators to enter the media
market would not be very effective at national level and would encourage national
monopolies or national champions. As the national market is limited, telecommunications
operators, in order to get a return on the investments necessary for the information
society, will have to acquire a strong position on that national market and hence integrate
vertically with the media services sector. By contrast, the emergence of a strong,
competitive sector in cross-border media serviceg, using information highways, would
limit the extent of vertical integration of telecommunications operators and would
encourage the creation of genuinely European information highways.
If the status quo is maintained the European market will not attract potential
international investment in the media. The new technologies entail costs and increasingly
require- 31 -
operators to go for cross-border niche markets involving several Member States. Yet the
current legal fragmentation, complexity and uncertainty make such a cross-border
approach difficult and discourage the investment which the i:nplementation of such a
strategy requires. In addition. traditional national players in the media sector would try to
expand in other markets around the world (e.g. Asia, Central and Eastern Europe), which
would result in a loss of investment in the Union. In some cases, maintaining the status
quo would, to the detriment of new potential players, mean no shake-up of current
operators - the rules on media ownership have made it necessary to develop very complex
alliance strategies often dictated by a particular political context - and would encourage
strategies that were national only. In the long term, such enterprises
, "
protected" by
closed rules, will no longer be competitive on the world media, and in particular the
multimedia, market.
On the demand side, the potential choice for European media consumers will be limited
and imports of media, especially multimedia, services from third countries such as the
United States will probably increase. However, the European media consumer will not be
the target for new, innovative services but rather will consume the services supplied in
those third countries.
(d) Coherence
Option I would create problems of consistency with regard to Community activities. The
information services sector and, in particular, the audiovisual sector receive priority
treatment, as the White Paper and the recent Green Paper on the competitiveness of
audiovisual programmes show. Consequently, it could be inconsistent to devise 
European policy solely for those aspects which relate to the exploitation of television
programmes or audiovisual works while not concerning oneself with direct investment, i.
with the financing of the media companies. Furthermore, the press, radio and multimedia
sectors could challenge the priority given to the audiovisual sector.
OPTION II (RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING TRANSl'ARENCY)
(a) Achieving the Community objectives
A recommendation designed simply to facilitate the exchange of information between
national authorities concerning the transparency of media ownership will not make it
possible to achieve the Community objectives, in particular those of the Internal Market.
Such a measure would not put an end to the disparities between national rules which are
the cause of the obstacles to the Internal Market. Of course, this does not mean that the
Commission regards the transparency of media ownership as unimportant. It means
rather, that this is not a subject which as such requires specific action at Community level.
Indeed, the Member States' answers in this respect showed that there were no real
obstacles to the exchange of informati~n. Moreover, questions concerning the quality of- 32-
national rules for ensuring transparency can be dealt with more effectively at national
level. On the other hand, if rules on media ownership were established at European level
rules on transparency and the exchange of information would be needed to implement
them.
(b) Prospects for change
The globalization of information activities should increase the requirements- of the national
supervisory authorities with regard to the exchange of information. However, it is
difficult to argue that this will necessarily increase the obstacles to the exchange of
information.
(c) Impact
The- option would have little economic impact, since it would be aimed primarily at
national supervisory authorities and not at companies. The information would not
necessarily be of the same type as that likely to interest companies, in particular with
regard to their merger and acquisition strategies. In addition, the conditions of
confidentiality would be different, since it would be information transmitted to the publiC"
authorities for the purposes of monitoring obligations relating to pluralism.
(d) Coherence
This option would be difficult to fit in with the other initiatives concerning the media, but
would not create problems of incompatibility.
OPTION III (HARMONIZATION OF NATIONAL RULES ON MEDIA
OWNERSHIP)
(a) Achieving the Community objectives
(i) The objectives of the Internal Market
The consultations tended to confirm the analysis in the Green Paper concerning the
obstacles to the Internal Market created by the disparities between the national rules on
media ownership. Consequently, to achieve in the media field the objectives of the
Internal Market set out in Article 7a of the Treaty, it is necessary to adopt Community
rules on media ownership. Such common rules would put an end to the disparities
between national rules concerning the media and would make it possible in particular to
do away with the two obstacles most often cited during the consultations, namely the lack
of legal certainty, which restricts the exercise of the treedom of establishment and the tree
movement of media services and which consequently discourages direct investment in the
media, and the distortions of competition created by the differences in the levels of
restriction. The Community objective justifying action at Community level is the
guaranteeing of the functioning of the Internal Market while safeguarding the requirement
to preserve pluralism by fixing certain limits on media ownership.
See &hove, ~II.B.l.- 33-
(ii) The objectives of the Internal Market in the context of the information society
Community rules on media ownership would also contribute to the priorities set out in the
White Paper entitled "Growth, competitiveness, employment. The challenges and ways
forward into the 21 st century" and would meet the concerns expressed in the report of the
High Level Group. The five priorities set out in the White Paper for the implementation of
, the information society include the creation of a suitable regulatory environment, requiring
in particular the removal of distortions of competition. In this respect, it is clear that the
current situation as regards media ownership could have a negative effect on the launching
of projects relating to the information society. As the White Paper explains, the success of
the information society will depend on the development of the services transported by the
networks. The greater the prospects for the profitable operation of bundles of varied
services with a high added value (education, culture, distance selling, health, games
entertainment, practical guides, etc.), the easier it will be to recoup investment in
inftastructure. Sound and audiovisual media and multimedia services will have an essential
role to play in the short term. Development of these services is a precondition for the
development of the infrastructure. This is therefore an essential strategic objective which
requires special regulatory treatment of the question of media ownership for three
reasons:
The obstacles to the free movement  of services and to the right of establishment created
by the current regulatory patchwork will limit the opportunity for operators of the
traditional media to supply their services on the information highways. The regulatory
obstacles to the free movement of information society services may result not only from
the conditions relating to the content of the services but also from those relating to the
supplier of those services. Thus, by limiting the opportunities to become a supplier, the
disparities between national rules on media ownership also restrict the opportunity to
supply more services and hence, to a certain extent, the viability of the information
society project. The prospects for information highways thus have the effect of radically
amplifYing the disadvantages resulting from the lack of suitable European rules.
The scenario of dismantling  all rules on media ownership is unrealistic and open to
challenge. Some operators pointed out during the consultations that the very principle of
having to have rules on media ownership would disappear because of the quantity of
channels available. The Commission would observe first of all that the dismantling of
national rules on media ownership is not yet a reality, whereas there is a real need now
to make the media industry more competitive. The debate developing in some Member
States is not about dismantling but about adaptation, in the form either of greater
flexibility (liberalization) or of greater effectiveness in achieving the objective of- 34-
pluralism. Secondly, from the substantive point of view, the question of external
pluralism will persist even in an environment where frequencies are no longer scarce.
The multiplication (by a factor of between 6 and 10) of the number of television
channels does not prevent the fact that they could all be controlled, in theory, by a single
operator. The possible reduction of the risk of concentration in control of the media
does not make protection against the unacceptable consequences of its possible
occurrence any less desirable.
That the national rules on media ownership are unsujted  to the new information
technologies was frequently emphasised during the consultations by the interests
concerned and by the High Level Group. Most often, the method used to. measure
concentration w~s regarded as unsuitable because the criterion of the number of
channels was inappropriate in a multichannel environment where frequencies were not
scarce. Excessive restrictions on the multimedia were also challenged since they limited
the possibility of using information highways to provide a bundle of media services.
Lastly, the degree of concentra,tion accepted was sometimes regarded as too restrictive
in view of the competitiveness needed to cope with the globalization of the media
industry.
(iii) The contribution of harmonization to pluralism
Implementation of the Internal Market objectives will help to ensure that pluralism 
better protected. The consultations highlighted that a common set of rules concerning
media ownership would make the protection of pluralism more effective by:
avoiding "havens which would enable operators who are not entitled to control a
medium to circumvent this prohibition by broadcasting via satellite from another
Member State which allowed such controL Even if, legally, the Member States receiving
the broadcasts in question could act to prevent them being retransmitted on their
territory, putting such protection into practice could, in some cases, be risky from a
technical and political viewpoint, for it might lead to disputes between national
authorities (on a national level, there is the DSF affair in Germany, where the authorities
in two Lander are disputing the legality of authorizing a new channel). A common set
of rules, by contrast, would have the effect of forcing Member States to ensure an
equivalent level of protection, if necessary by introducing new provisions whiCh some
Member States did not have before;
properlv covering cross-border activities, which are going to expand increasingly as a
result of the new technologies. National rules are unsuitable as a means of dealing with
cross-border activities, particularly in certain cases where they fail to take into account
the effect on other Member States of a licence to broadcast a television channel which
will be received in those Member States. In addition, since the provisions will be the
same, it will be easier to ensure the transparency and monitoring of media ownership as
the national authorities will have to look for the same type of information;- 35-
applying control at source rather than at reception. In accordance with the principle of
home country control and' of mutual trust, the competent national authority for granting
an authorization or a licence will have to take into account not only the interest of
citizens on its territory but also that of citizens in the other Member States who might be
able to receive the channel in question. Thus, the public interest to be preserved does
not stop at national borders but at the frontiers of the Community, and the European
responsibilities of the national supervisory authorities will be clearly defined.
Supervision and any prevention will be more effective, since they will be aimed directly
at the enterprise in question rather than at intermediaries (cable distributors
manufacturers of receiving equipment. etc.
improving the quality of the regulatory framework by taking the positive experiences of
different Member States into account. The second round of consultations should make
it possible to hold such an exchange of experience and satisfy the quality requirement
which the objective of preserVing pluralism imposes. Moreover, discussions at
Community level help to escape the purely national interference that may occur in 
national legislative process and affect its consistency and quality;
the criteria envisaged will provide more effective protection: the actual audience
criterion would be a more effective way of guaranteeing pluralism than the number of
channels, since a single channel may have a substantial audience and, hence, considerable
influence. Conversely, an operator may be penalized for having several channels when
they are in fact specialized .channels with extremely small audiences, providing extra
pluralism. The controller criteria, as anieans of identifying the operator responsible for
the media whose audience is measured, makes it possible to go beyond a formal
definition (majority shareholder), which does not take account of the de facto control of
the media;
not letting the media in certain countries be put at a disavantage or threatened
compared with the media in other Member States simply because the latter are subject to
laxer rules on media ownership which have enabled them to acquire a certain size-
(iv) The Community objectives and the European independent committee
The consultations did not throw much light on the advantage of setting up a European
independent committee to achieve the Community objectives, or on the gains that it would
bring as regards the Internal Market. As far as the role of the committee is concerned
care should be taken not to set up a new type of committee. In this respect, the role
desired by Parliament, i.e. that the committee should express an opinion on specific
mergers, could clash with the principle of subsidiarity and be inconsistent with the basic
principles of "Internal Market" control. In this regard, unless the particular circumstances- 36-
so warrant. it is the competent national authorities which should, as the authority in
ordinary law, apply directly the national. rules transposing a Community I1Jle without
centralisation at Community leveL The need for such a co.mmittee should therefore be
assessed, at the appropriate time, in the light of the substance of the Community initiative.
(b) Prospects for change
Foreseeable developments indicate that action should be taken concerning the ownership
of the media, Such action will (a) make it possible to create the structural 'conditions that
are 'essential if advantage is to be taken of the new environment of globalization and (b)
avoi(i the risks of uncoordinated national legislative reactions.
The new technologies and the new economic environment,  The new technologies (digital
television, compression and convergence) will have a considerable impact on the
development of the media market. In particular, the new ~echnologies encourage the
globalization of markets and will therefor~ have the ' effect of increasingly confronting the
media industry with the competition from operators in third countries, The latter could be
more competitive than European operators, either because of t"'~ir position on their home
market or because they are new entrants to the media industry and come from a sector
where companies are much larger than traditional media operators,
The political and legal environment  will probably evolve in the short to medium term on
account, first, of the pressure from traditional media operators to change it and, second
of political concern about the tendency t9wards vertical integration by
telecommunications operators entering the market for information society services,
Impact (c)
(i) Political impact
At European level Option III would accord with the desire expressed by Parliament and
the Economic and Social Committee, which have come out clearly in favour of 
directive on media ownersbip in conjunction with the establishment of a committee, The
Commission is aware that the selection of Option III would be a proportionate response
to the concerns expressed by Parliament on several occasions. Option III would also be a
response to the report of the High Level Grc"Jp,
At national level Option III might possibly gene:'ate certain misunderstandings if action by
the Community is interpreted as being '\n extension of the Community's powers, In this
respect, the Commission would point out that the power to act in this matter derives from
the Community objective of the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market
(Article 7a of the Treaty), which, in this particular case, would require- 37-
harmonization of the national rules on pluralism limiting media ownership so as to abolish
the restrictions on freedom of establishment and the free movement of services. Action on
medw. ownershir. would not therefore result in widening the scope of Community powers
but would lie v...ithin the traditional framework of powers associated with the Internal
Market.
Setting up a committee of wise men,  as envisaged in Option IDc, could have a
considerable impact on the institutional organization of broadcasting in the Member
States. One of the suboptions in Option ID proposes that a committee be set up consisting
of representatives from the independent national authorities responsible for radio and
television. Such authorities exist in certain countries only (e,g, the Medienanstalten in
Germany, the ITC in the United Kingdom or the CSA in France). In ot~er Member States
independent radio and television authorities do not exist, or if they do they have no real 
powers or simply an advisory role, If this option is selected therefore, it would be
necessary to establish such independent authorities in those Member States which do not
have them, Failing this, the committee would not be really representative, since some of
its members would have no particular experience at national level. Given that it has not
been clearly established how far the committee would make it possible for the objectives
of the Union to be achieved more effectively, the Commission thinks it would 
preferable to. wait for its proposal to be formally 'adopted before commenting on the
advisability of proposing such a committee, It will then be a matter of determining. in
particular, whether such independent authorities have been established in the Member
Stz.-;., ;:J which (:L' not yet have them.
As to the choice of the instrument and without prejudice to any other form the
Community initiative might adopt, a regulation might be an effectvie solution since it
would guarantee maximum legal certainty for th~ econ9mic operators and avoid instances
of poor transposition or even no transposition at all. However. the advantages of a
directive might be particularly appropriate where the subject is politically so sensitive: it
would provide a certain flexibility of transposition, would constitute a genend ftamework
allowing national authorities a certain discretion, and would give a special role to national
parliaments. In view of the political impact which action on media ownership could have
the Commission believes therefore that it would be better to use a directive as a basis.
(ii) Economic impact
The economic impact of any rules will depend, obviously, on their content and is difficult
to assess at this stage. However, the establishment of a single regulatory framework for
media ownership has an economic impact in itself, irrespective of the content.
On the supply side common rules in the field of the media, and the legal certainty which
this would provide, would have the effect of opening up access to the market and, in
particular, of stimulating direct investment in the media sector. Such investment could. - 38-
come above all from new entrants. Hitherto, the specific limits in each country on access
to media ownership, and the often politicised environment of media activities, have
spawned "barony" strategies rather th~J..n industrirJ strategies and encouraged companies to
structure their capital in a complex web of share:::~oldings, The adoption of European rules
not connected with the specific circumstances of each Member States should encourage
investors, who have hitherto been reluctant to invest in such a legally and politically
complex and uncertain environment.
Such investment could provoke restructuring and a tendency to concentration which must
be covered by the rules, The new niche markets that will be developed as a result of the
information society will be both risky and costly (on account of the technology used and
uncertainty about the potential demand for new media services), Operators will therefore
tend to minimise such risks through a strategy of alliance or acquisition and concentration
so as to reduce the number .of players and attain a sufficiently large critical mass to cover
the necessary rates ofinvestment.
On the demand side the decompartmentalisation of national markets would expand
certain markets or create new ones, The niche markets of the special-interest media could
be affected toa greater extent. While the resources supplied at national level for a niche
market are often inadequate, they could be appropriate if the formula were applied
extensively at European level.. Rules on media ownership could . enable those operators
who wished to do so ( for economic reasons), to follo'!,v more easily an establishment
stn"':" ~gy wher~by a comp'1.ny would become ef"'-blished i..' Jach tew+-
,ry in  ore to adar"
its --.edia ser, ~;:e to a p?dcular pLL,Iic. Ownl' ,,;up, the L .,;he cone, I": arid thc,aow-ho\
are European, but the "product" is adapted to each public, Traditional national markets
might thus be subject to suchan establishment strategy by operators from other Member
States, Lastly, it should be noted that common rules would facilitate the development of
markets for the cross-border dissemination of television or radio services by limiting the
lack of legal certainty surrounding cross~border broadcasting by television channels not in
conformity with national provisions on media ownership. Information highways will
increase the opportunities for cross-border broadcasting not only for new services but for
traditional media such as sound radio and will heighten the risk that operators will be
accused of circumventing national legislation. 
To sum up,  it is clear that opening up national markets with regard to media ownership
should encourage direct investment in the media sector, particularly from new entrants
and result in a trend towards restructuring and concentration, The advantage of
establishing a safety net to avoid media concentrations which threaten pluralism might
therefore become clear
, .
as might - 39 - .
the advantage of determining that net at Community level. As well as there being a safety
standard guaranteeing pluralism, investment in the media sector would be stimulated by
the openness of the mt\rket and the legal certainty provided by a single European
regulatory framework. By contrast, if the .safety net were still determined at national level
investment would be discouraged and the, competitivc11ess of national operators would be
limited by the strategies of "national champions" and "barons" and by complex,
ftagmented shareholdings. Lastly, the importance of the quality of the content of the
common rules is just as clear, since it should have to fulfil its fundamental purpose of
preventing concentrations which threaten pluralism while not being disproportionate so as
to facilitate as much investment as possible in the media sector.
(d) Coherence
Option ill is connected with the Community's other culTent initiatives relating to the
media,
The White Paper on Growth, competitiveness and employment, and the report of the
High Level Group.  As emphasised above, Option III accords with the logic of the
approach adopted in the White Paper to bringing about the information society and with
the proposals of the High Level Group. An initi.ltive on media ownership woul1 be one of
the measures needed to adapt the regulatory frrmework to the information society. The
objective of making the media industry more competitive will have to b~ taken into
account when det~rmining the substance of any measure.
The Green Paper on Strategy options to strengthen the European programme industry
in  the context of the audiovisual policy of the European Union.  The Green Paper
initiated a debate on a number of strategic options for the audiovisual programmes
industry, This Green raper differs from that on pluralism andlT'edia concentration in
scope, which does not cover all the media but only the audiovisual sector, and in its
object, which does not relate to ownership of the media but to the promotion of the
production and distribution of programmes.
Digital Vul.eo Broadcasting.  An initiative on media ownership is also fully in keeping with
the logic  01'  the culTent work on digital video broadcasting which should result in both
operators and suppliers of services being guaranteed the widest possible access to the new
technologies.
Competition policy.  An initiative on media ownership would be consistent with and
complementary to the application of competition law. Its objective would not be to
safeguard competition but to safeguard pluralism through rules  on  media ownership to the
extent needed to ensure the proper functioning of the Internal Market.- 40-
The possibility of taking other measures to promote pluralism is already pro-;ided for by
Article 21(3) of the Merger Control Regulation, The substance of this initiative should be
strictly proportionate to the general interest ( preservation of pluralism) so as to provide
maximum security in this respect but without duplicating efforts or embracing siiuations
which may be covered by competition law,
Conclusions
Having anaIysed the results of the consultation process, which lasted more thana year
the Commission has reached the conclusion that it should in view of the challenges posed
by the safegu8rding of media pluralism, launch a second round of consultation with all the
parties concerned and in close contact with the Member States.
This second stage of the consultation process will be useful to confirm or reject the need
for a Community initiative. especially taking into consideration the development of the
new technologies, and in the event of an intiative being proposed, it will give the
Commission the opportunity to deepen the questions concerning its potential content in
order to assure its quality.
One could hypothesise that such a Community initiative could be based on th~ following
lines:
THE SCOPE OF THE DEBATE
The obstacles to the functioning of the Internal Market, identified in the Green Paper and
created by the disparities between national rules on media ownership, and their potential
negative effects on pluralism, have recently assumed a new dimension, Regarded at first
as potential, these obstacles are becoming increasingly apparent .and tangible. The
globalization of the media industry and the development of new information technologies
make it essential to transfonil the media sector into a genuine, competitive European
industry capable of energetically playing its specific role in the operation of democracy.
Accordingly, the completion of the Internal Market is both a necessity and an opportunity,
The national regulatory framework for media ownership will evolve, or is already doing so
in some Member States so as to adapt to this new situation, As the report of the High
Level Group emphasises, the prospect of such 1,lncoordinated legislative activity threatens
to accentuate still further the harmful effects of the disparities between national rules on
the new media services. Isolated, merely national responses to the globalization of the
media would threaten to fragment the Internal Market still further and might rapidly
become ineffective or even counterproductive by preventing the economic development of
media operators, which is essential to pluralism, and the cross-border movement of their
services.- 41-
A MORE DETAILED EXAMINATION OF 'CERTAIN QUESTIONS
RELATING TO THE CONTENT OF AN INITIATIVE
Hitherto, the consultations have largely concerned the question of the need for common
rules at European level on media o~"l1e~hip, :',ey have Gonfirmed. however, +hat the
broad guidelines laid down in the Green Paper concerning the possible architecture of an
initiative on media ownership provide a good starting point, Without prejudice to the
conclusions the Commission might draw frOlr'. the second stage of the consultation
proc( 3S, the latter will have to examin' ~hc follo\ ' ng questions in particular:
(a) A balanced general appr(!'.Ach
The object of the initiative would be to enable operators fully to exploit the opportunities
created by the Internal Market, in particular freedom of establishment for media
companies and the free movement of media services, and at the same time to maintain
pluralism by preventing concentration of the media. The initiative would establish both the
maximum legal certainty needed for investment in the media sector and a safety net
preventing cases of concentration which threatened pluralism and which cannot be
combated by the traditional rules of competition law. A stable legal framework which
would not weaken the protection of pluralism in the Member States and which would
guarantee an equivalent level of protection within the Union.
The conditions relating to media ownership which should be applied by the competent
national authorities when they grant an authorization or a licence for a new broadcasting
medium (television or radio) or when control is newly acquired of an existing broadcasting
medium. should be examined on the basis of the orientations foreseen by the Green Paper,
Given the scope of current national legislation, these conditions should apply at least to
those cases where an C?perator applying for a licence for a radio station or television
channel already controls a radio station or television channel (monomedia radio or
monomedia television concentration) and where the operator applying for a radio or
television licence already controls a medium of a different type such as a newspaper
publishing firm (multimedia concentration). The question of the coverage of mergers
between press enterprises (monomedia press concentration) will have to be examined
during the second round of consultations, taking into account the fact that only two
Member States have laid down specific rules in their legislation. In accordance with the
principle of proportionality, these conditions should not go beyond what is necessary 
achieve the fixed objectives and should therefore strike a balance between the need to
guarantee the diversity of media controllers and the need to facilitate access to media
activities so as to promote the development of the media industry. During the new
consultation:, therefore, the implications in terms of the degree of constraint of the
various conditions that might be contemplated will have to be determined in order to be
certain of their proportionality. In the light of the analysis in the Green Paper of the
substance of a possible initiative
18 it should cover: the definition of media " controller ; the
limitation
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of certain cases of cumulative control over various media companies simultaneou.~I.y by a
single person; the use, to this end, of the criteria of the distribution area cover~. and the
actual media audience served by a single media controller; the question of persons who
are excluded ftom becoming a media controller ("disqualified persons ); the transparency
and exchange of information on media control; and the cases in which there is a C1ange of
media controller.
(b) The criterion of the actual audience
As itidicated in the Green Paper, it is logical to apply the criterion of the actual audience
since, it being a question of the pluralism of the media, it is necessary to assess th?, effects
of the concentration of media control on the "citizen consumer . Compared with the
criterion of the number of channels that can be controlled by a single person, the criterion
of the actual audience has the advantage of being more suited to the new environment of
information technologies and the information society, which will lead to a multiplicity of
channels, It would also be economically more sensitive and less harsh (the creation of a
bundle of specialized channels would be facilitated, whereas the criterion of the number 
channels could prevent this) and more effective as regards preserving pluralism
(depending on its actual audience, a single channel can ITustrate pluralism). Compared
with market share, the actual audience has the advantage that it does not duplicate the
efforts of competition law, which uses this criterion to assess the behaviour of economic
operators among themselves (taking account, in particular, of earnings) and not to
evaluate as such the impact of media control on the "citizen consumer . The criterion of
the actual audience raises a number of questions, hqwever, which have prompted the
Commission to launch a feasibility study. This examines, in particular, the comparability
and compatibility of the different national systems of audience measurement, the types 
audience measurement that can be used and the possibility of using a single composite
criterion or of combining several types of measurement depending on the configuration of
the media in question,
(c) The criterion of the media controller
The task here will be to find a definition which makes it possible, when a new channel is
launched by an operator (or when he acquires control of an existing channel), to determine
what media are already controlled by the. operator and broadcast or distributed over the
same area as that of the new .channel. Once the various media have been inventoried, it
will be possible to determine the total actual audience controlled by a single operator.
The advantage of determining who controls what media is that it will then be possible to
provide, at one and the same time, the legal certainty necessary for investment. sufficient
effectivenes~ for avoiding circumvention and a high level of feasibility resulting in easy
implementation, and to take account of new equilibria between the players resulting43 -
ttom the new technologies, The Commission has also initiated a study on this subjeCt, to
. find a definition of "controller" which will reflect experience at national level and will
dovetail with the various definitions of control already used in competition law and
company law.
The issue of "disqualified" persons In defining control, it will also be necessary to
determine. as is done in certain national laws, the categories of person who cannot
become a media controller on account of their duties or aCtivities.
(d) Other questions
Other questions will have to be examined, such as the legal form which the initiative
should take, the question of the coverage of monomedia press concentration, the question
of the need for an independent committee and the matters raised by the evolution of the
new technologies, such as the definition of the new media and the link with the problems
of access,
(e) Consultations on these questions
The Commission is aware of the need to examine more thoroughly certain questions
concerning content before the initiative is presented. In the months ahead, specific
consultations on these matters will be held with the interests concerned (in particular thos.
who have already taken part in the consultations on the; need for action). The analysis of
the results of the two studies referred to above will be distributed in addition to a
questionnaire on the method envisaged for regulating access to ownership, The
CoI1)1'nission is keen to maintain close contact with Parliament and the national authorities
throughout this process. The competent national authorities will be requested to provide
contributions to the debate.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETWORK OF' INTERESTS CONCERNED IN.
MEDIA OWNERSHIP
The Commission is particularly anxious to maintain and develop the links which were
forged with MEPs and the interests concerned during the consultation process. The value
of the network which emerged comes partly ttom its composition - MEPs, industry
associations and individual operators - and partly ttom its multisectoral nature, comprising
as it does operators with activities in radio, television, the press and multimedia, These
different seCtors are not always in the habit of comparing their interests, which are
increasingly common however, as soon as the subject of who owns the media is broached.
This flexible and informal structure should be developed, in particular to include certain
Member States whose operators have not been much in evidence hitherto. .44 -
The network, which deserves to be upgraded, could prefigure, in the medium term, a
more multisectoral structure comprising all services using information high~ays. The
Commission is encouraging industry circles to org5.nize themselves accordingly, so as 
promote the expansion of information society services.
Timetable
The consultations will be launched in the autumn with a view to receiving the observations
tram all interested parties during the winter of 1994/95, The consultations will start with
the distribution of the results of the studies and a questionnaire, It will be in the light of
these consultations that a potential initiative could be presented during 1995.-lts" 
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~U""ARY
The purpose of the Green Paper 
is to pr.esent an I nit I a I ass~ssment of the
need for eornmunltY action concern.!ng concentration In the media
(Television. radio. press) together with the different approaches which the
commission might adopt once It has consulted the parties concerned.
In recent years. Parliament has expressed 
ts  concern abOUt th.ls question,
on several occasions. In part Icular 
In Its resolUt Ions of 15 February 1990
and 16 September 1992. whiCh call on the commission to propose 
regulatory
measures so as to restr Ict concentrat Ion
pluralism.
In the media and safeguard
In the I Ight of the communlty s objectives and powers. the results of this
look Into the need for act Ion can be summar Izedas fol lows:
1. Protection of ~Iurallsm as such Is primarily a matter for
Member States. In working towards its object Ives and exercising
the
its
powers, the Community must. 
however, ensure that Its own act Ivlt les and
, those for which it has competence do not adverselY affect pluralism. 
this respect with regard solely to tM objective of safeguarding plural Ism.
there would not appear to be any need for action at community 
level, since
national mechanisms for protecting pluralism can be apPI 
led to situations
with a community dimension. Thus. should a broadcaster establ ished In
another Member State genuinely circumvent legislation on plural ism. the
Member State of reception could. subject to observing the conditions laid
down In the case law of the Court of Just Ice. restr Ict the free movement of
such broadcasts. SImilarly, where a merger declared to be compatible with
the common market u"der the Merger Control Regulat Ion Is harmful tQ
pluralism. the Member State would stili be able to take appropriate
measures to ensure that pluralism Is protected.- S""o 
2. This capacity of the Member States' to safeguard pluralism thrpugh a national regulatory. framework: for mergers may. however lead to
Interference within the area w~thout frontiers consisting of the Community.
Since the mld-1980s . laws on media ownership have been Introduced and are
developing In divergent. ways. Such laws on pluralism. which consist 
. particular In I imlting maximum holdings In media companies. and 
preventing cumulative control of. or holdings in
. several media companies
at once. must be distinguished from the discriminatory restrictions which
limit ownership by foreigners and which are therefore Incompatible with the
Treaty.
3. Disparities between national measures aiming to safeguard pluralism
may . at least potentially. Impact upon the functioning of thls..area without
front iers :
- a Member State could possibly restrict the free movement of broadcasts
In the event of genuine circumvention of one of these laws;
the establ ishment of media companies In anoth~r Member State could be
Ibllted;
restrictions and distortions of competition are introduced;
uncertainty in the law. harmfUl to the competitiveness of companies
could resul t from diverging views on what const itutes circumvent ion;
such laws I imlt access to the activities and to the ownership of the
media. when access shou I d faci I itated perm it the
estab I I shment of the sing I e market and .secure the compet I t I veness 
media companies which plural ism requires.
4. The restrictions on ownership at the root of these effects .
are not. as
such Incompatible with Community law. They are not discriminatory and
pursue a publlc~interest object Ive associated with freedom of expression.
5. Restrictions on media ownership cannot be replaced Just by applYing
general competition law and in particular . at COmmunity level . the Merger
Control Regulat ion. The latter can prevent mergers wh Ich adversely affect
pluralism only in so far as they also affect competition . which Is not
a Iways the case.5..-1-
6. In the I ight of this analysis. there are threedlfferent options aII1Ong
which the commission may choose and on which the commission would like to
know the opinions of the part les concerned:
(I) taking no action;
(II) proposing a recommendation to enhance transparency;
(III) proposing the
ownersh I P by
(a) a COuncil Direct Ive, or
(b) a COuncil regulat Ion. or
(c) a direct Ive or a regulat.lon
harmonlzat Ion  nat lonal restr Ictlons on media
together wi th an Independent
convnittee.
The commission does not currently have .a part Icular preference for. anyone
Of these opt Ions and I eaves open the poss I b II i ty for other eventua I
alternatives. It wishes to know the views of Interested parties on these
options as well as on the questions ,posed In this Green paper which are
summar I sed below:
QUESTION 
The  CommIssIon would welcome  the  vlf!Ws  of  Interested parties regarding  the
needs for act/on. 8.IId In particular  on:
-any cases where the CommunIty dImension 
of  medIa activity has meant that
restrIctions  on  /IIedla ownership Imposed for the purpose  of  maintaIning
pluralIsm have become Ineffective. for example because they are
circumvented or because  of  transparency problems;
the existence  of  restrictIons or restrictive  effects  other thl:1i1 those
Identified above;
practical Instances where ownershIp restrictIons have actually Impeded
the activity  of  economic operators In the sector;s~-
the sectors 8.1Jd activities which are especially affected by restrictions
on  ownership (for example, Is  the  press subject  to  restrictive  effects not
only In respect  of  multimedia  aspects  but also In respect  of  I1IOnomedla
aspects?) 
QUEST ION 
The Commission would weicollle the 
views  of  Interested parties on whe.ther the
needs Identified are  of  sufficient l~por~ance, In the light  of  Community
obJectives,  to  require action In  the  media Industry and, If so, when  such
action should  be  taken.
QUESTION 
The  Commission would welcome  the  views  of  Interested parties  on the
effectiveness, In the light 
of  Community objectives, of action which would
be taken solely  at  Member  State  level.
QUESTION 
The  Commission would welcome the views 
of  Interested parties  on  the  content
of a  possible harmonization Instrument as envisaged above, and In
particular  on  the two variants for Its 
~. 
on  the use  of  the  real
audience as a  basis for setting thresholds,  on  the demarcation 
distribution areas on any  other Dosslble references . and on wayS of
defining the concept of  controller
QUEST! ON 5
The commission would we I come the views of Interested part las on the
desirability of action to promote transparency which would be  seDarate from
a harmonlzat Ion Instrument.
QUESTION 6
The commission would welcome the views of Interested parties on the
deslrab.llty of setting up a bOdYiwlth c~pe~ence for media concentration.$""3-
QUESTION 7
The COmmission would welcome the views of Interested parties on each of
these foreseeable options.14. 02.
--~tf 
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10. Pluralism and media concentration
A3-O435/93
Resolution on the Commission Green Paper 'Pluralism and media concentration in the
internal market'
The European Parliament,
having regard to the Commission Green Paper 'Pluralism and media concentration in the
internal market' (COM(92)0480 - C3-oo35/93),
having regard to Rule 51 of its Rules of Procedure
having regard to the report of the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media
and the opinions of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights and the Committee
on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy (A3-0435/93),
A. having regard to its resolutions of 15 February 19900n media takeovers and mergers (' ) and
16 September 1992 on media concentration and diversity of opinions (2), in which it drew
attention to the dangers of media concentration for diversity of opinion and pluralism and
expressed the view that national media legislation alone was no longer sufficient to
safeguard diversity of opinion and pluralism in Europe
B. welcoming the fact that the Commission has considered the problem, presented its Green
Paper 'Pluralism and media concentration in the internal market' and, in advance of
Community measures, has already initiated a comprehensive consultation process with the
parties concerned
C. whereas media concentration and cross-ownership are increasing in the Community;
whereas, once established, such cross-ownership, where it reduces diversity of opinion, is
difficult to reverse
D. convinced that legislation should therefore be adopted without delay to enable the
Community, where necessary, to take measures to limit media concentration on a European
scale which threatens diversity of opinion and pluralism,
E. wh~eas there is a need to hannonize national legislation which imposes restrictions on the
media in order firstly to prevent them being evaded and secondly to safeguard the operation
of the internal market, thereby at the same time increasing the competitiveness of the
European media,
F. having regard to the important contribution made by public broadcasting to promoting
diversity of opinion, pluralism and general education; whereas such broadcasting is subject
to different market conditions from commercial broadcasting,
G. whereas the market share of public non-commercial broadcasting in some Member States
has been declining sharply since the advent of commercial broadcasting,
) OJC68, 19.3, 1990, p, 137,
(') OJ C 284, 2, 11, 1992, p. 44,- ~~-
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H. whereas the change towards multi-media is coming fast as a result of technological
developments; whereas a Directive is needed to take account of its impact on the mass
media,
whereas the Community should accede to the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and thereby take on the obligation to protect freedom of expression
and the diversity deriving therefrom and should contribute to further development of that
right,  inter alia  in relation to countries with which it has concluded association or other
agreements
noting that the world market for media (TV, radio, written material) is huge, that today the
EC has the largest individual share of it, and that this sector has great employment potential
for the future
K. whereas the internal market for the media sector can provide more profits, jobs and cultural
diversity, and hence lead to a greater readiness to invest, more training places and more
research and development activity in the sector
L. bearing in mind that legislation on media concentration must take into account not only, the
economic dimension hut also, and to an equal degree, the cultural dimension, and that
strengthening the overall competitiveness of European media must be accompanied by
strengthening of economic and cultural pluralism in this sector
M. aware that the control of a large audience share within a particular area by one individual or
company poses a danger to pluralism, cultural diversity and the quality of the media, by
lessening media autonomy and independence
N. whereas pluralism in the media is an essential element in the construction of the European
Union in accordance with the requirements of democracy and respect for human rights laid
down by Article F of the Treaty on European Union,
O. whereas the disparities between Member States' legislation on pluralism and concentration
may represent an obstacle to the operation of the internal market, particularly as regards the
freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment, 
I. Calls on the Commission to submit a proposal for a Directive firstly harmonizing national
restrictions on media concentration and secondly enabling the Community to intervene in the
event of concentration which endangers pluralism on a European scale; in doing so the
Commission should consult the parties concerned in accordance with Option III, Sub-option c, as
refeITed to in the Green Paper (Directive or Regulation in conjunction with an independent
committee); the following criteria should apply:
(a) it should cover the entire media sector, i.e. the print media as well as the audiovisual media;
only in this way can multimedia concentration (cross-ownership) be assessed more
effectively and, if necessary, limited,
(b) it must not be based on the issue offormal ownership alone: it must be possible to investigate
whether a 'dominant influence' exists for other reasons (e. g. sleeping partners, alliances,
dependence on one programme supplier or one advertiser),
(c) certain groups/companies should be excluded from participation in particular media sectors
(disqualified persons): for example, advertising agencies should not be allowed to run
newspapers or radio or television companies and vice versa,
(d) syndicates for the purchase of advertising space should likewise be subject to stringent
national and Community provisions governing competition, to ensure that they cannot
influence the editorial lines of the various media either directly or indirectly; the linking of
advertising and programming (barter) should be restricted
(e) links involving programme suppliers, including holders of programme rights and pro-
gramme producers, on the one hand, and broadcasters on the other hand, should be subjecJ to
a strict application of the law on competition14. 02.
S-c:. 
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(t) the principle of absolute transparency of ownership should apply; radio and television
broadcasters should be compelled to reveal full details of ownership and trusteeships and any
other relevant economic data (by analogy with cartel law); changes in ownership should be
reported. Independent experts appointed by the supervisory authorities for the media and
required to maintain confidentiality must be allowed to inspect the relevant documents,
including tax documents, upon request; refusal to disclose such information on the grounds
that it is confidential for commercial reasons should be prohibited
(g) in so far as, by virtue of effective safeguards provided by national legislation, a broadcasting
organization is structured independently and in such a lnanner as to ensure internal diversity,
and operates on a non-profit-making basis, it should be exempted from the provisions of the
Directive except those on transparency,
(h) in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, any Community action mustallow the Member
States sufficient scope to meet the particular requirements of the media in their country. This
applies above all to the organizational structure of the media, programming rules and
positive measures including those to promote non-commercial radio stations or independent
newspapers,
(i) it must be possible inter alia  for Member States, to respond to neW and currently
unforeseeable threats to diversity of opinion, for example if telephone companies offer to
distribute programmes,
(j) the independent committee or European Media Council should have a purely advisory
function: with the support of the national institutions responsible for the media, the following
tasks and powers should be entrusted to it:
observing developments in the media both in Europe and elsewhere, including
technical/economic and social trends; submitting a report on the media every two years
ensuring complete transparency with regard to cross-ownership (disclosure of all private
and public share-holdings),
submitting to the Commission reports and opinions on planned mergers between
enterprises on a Community or European scale
making proposals to the Commission concerning possible deconcentration measures;
2. Takes the view that the proportion of media consumers reached by a particular media
proprietor (controller) is an appropriate additional criterion for assessing the degree of
concentration in the media;
3. Takes the view that the quality and diversity of this sector (how this industry develops and
the information it seeks to provide) is at the very heart of democracy;
4. Expects the harmonization .of national provisions restricting media concentration to afford a
high level of protection to pluralism and diversity of opinion and expects that, at the same time,
access to the market for new media enterprises will be eased;
5. Calls on the Community and Member States to do their utmost to ensure that the EC
Directive is subsequently complemented by a Council of Europe Convention in order to take into
account the pan.European dimension of media concentration;
6. Calls on the Commission once again to present proposals concerning the catalogue of
measures set out in the European Parliament s resolution of 16 September 1992 and propose an
action programme to promote pluralism and diversity of opinion, including, in particular:
a proposal for a Directive on the right of access to information from Community and national
authorities, along the lines of the US Freedom of Information Act,
a European media code to maintain professional ethics, which should ideally be drawn up by
the parties concerned,
a framework Directive safeguarding journalistic and editorial independence in all media;
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Council.-- S;1- Annex 5
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, ~ 
provide for possible consultation before the Com-
m,ission finalizes its decision, and
Done at Brussels, 22 September 1993,
lay down criteria for consideration of the Com-
mittee s . proposals by the Commission and the
Council.
The Chairman
of the Economic and Social Committee
Susanne TIEMANN
Opinion on the Commission Green Paper on pluralism and media concentration in the
internal market - an assessment of the need for Community action
(93/C 304/07)
On 15 February 1993, the Commission decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee
under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the
Commission Green Paper on pluralism and media concentration in the internal market -
an :i!.ssessment of the need for Community action,
The Section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services, which was responsible for preparing
the Committee s work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 7 July 1993, The Rapporteur
was Mr FIum,
At its 308th Plenary Session (meeting of 22 September 1993) the Economic and Social
Committee adopted the following Opinion by a majority with seven votes against and
15 abstentions, '
The Committee welcomes the publication of the Green
Paper, and particularly appreciates the comprehensive
picture it provides of the existing legal situation in the
Member States,
The Committee also welcomes the form taken by the
Green Paper which, instead of making precipitate state-
ments, paves the way for extensive dialogue between
the various groups in society,
1. Introduction
1.1. The ESC has played a constructive part in the
formulation of Community options for the electronic
media during and since the preparation of the Council
Directive of 3 October 1989 (I) on the coordination of
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States concerning the
pursuit of television broadcasting activities (the tele-
) OJ No L 298, 10. 1989.
vision without frontiers Directive). It made a direct
contribution to the drafting of that Directive by propos-
ing important elements, .
1.2, In view of the discussion in the Green Paper, it
seems necessary to restate the basic principles of ESC
media policy to date, Thus, in its Opinion of 25 Sep-
tember 1985 (2) on the Green Paper on the establishment
of the common market for broadcasting, especially by
satellite and cable e), the Committee stated that it was
not the task of the Community to interfere with the
media structure of individual Member States. The
licensing of television and radio organizations should
remain the sole responsibility of the Member State
concerned, although care had to be taken to ensure
there was no threat to the pluralism of information and
opinions in the Community. In the same Opinion, the
Committee called on the Commission to examine to
what extent new proposals were needed to align
national provisions on programme content in order to
ensure uniform terms of competition; in this connec-
tion, it made particular reference to the following areas:
) OJ No C 303, 25. 11. 1985, p. 13.
e) Doc. COM(84) 300 final.- ~8'-
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protecting minors, right  of  reply, copyright for authors
performers and producers, television advertising. From
the present standpoint, it was also particularly
important to examine in greater detail the influence 
television advertising and the independence and com-
pleteness  of  information broadcasts and the influence
of  advertising agencies on the trade in programmes, In
its Resolution on media concentration and diversity
of  opinions  of  16 September 1992(1), the European
Parliament expressed concern 'at increasing concen-
tration in the advertising business and its substantial
influence on programming and media content ; the
Commission also intends to investigate the situation
with regard to advertising,
1.3, In its Opinion  of  1 July 1987 (2) on the Proposal
for a Council Directive on the coordination  of  certain
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrat-
ive action in Member States concerning the pursuit 
broadcasting activities (3) the Committee expressed the
view that the national legislative and administrative
measures to be taken in broadcasting must steer clear
of  any arrangements which might tend to create a
dominant opinion-former. In its Additional Opinion 
27 April 1989 (4) the Committee again stressed the need
to prevent any acts which could promote the creation
of  a dominant position and thereby restrict pluralism
and freedom  of  information, The Committee is
extremely encouraged to note that the television Direc-
tive adopted by the Council contains a section reg-
ulating the right  of  reply  of  all natural and legal persons
whose lawful interests are damaged by false statements
on television, The Economic and 'Social Committee was
the first Community body to demand this right in
the course  of  the drafting process, being subsequently
followed by Parliament, the Commission and the
Council. Full account has also been taken  of  the Com-
mittee scomments on copyright, the protection  of  chil-
dren and minors and advertising, with the latter being
banned in the case  of  tobacco products and prescription
drugs for medical treatment.
1.4. In its Opinion  of  20 December 1989 (5) on a
fresh boost for culture in the European Community (6
the Committee noted that the development  of  huge
European media corporations was hallmarked by glo-
balization, interlinking and the establishment  of  con-
glomerates. Appropriate anti-trust measures were there-
fore needed. The Committee urged the Commission, to
consider setting down more clearly the limits to cross-
holdings and media monopolization, notably through
measures requiring transparency  of  financial trans-
actions and the full disclosure  of  international holdings.
) OJ No C 284, 2. 11. 1992, p. 44.
(2) OJ No C 232, 31. 8. 1987,p. 29.
) OJ No C 179, 17. 7. 1986, p. 4.
OJ  NoC 159, 26. 6. 1989, p. 67.
OJ  No C 62, 12. 3. 1990, p. 26.
OJ  No C 175, 7. 1988.
It also proposed the .creation  of  a Europe~n Media
Observatory in order to monitor and, where appropri-
ate, curb such economic concentrations, and to help
promote and ensure freedom  of  information and cul-
tural pluralism.
1.5. The Committee also called for back-up EC
measures to guarantee minimum protection for pro-
fessional standards, ethics, editorial autonomy and free-
dom  of'  conscience for all roedia journalists and
employees. Likewise, EC instruments were needed in
order to ensure basic collective contractual rights and
social insurance cover for employees involved in the
media, and to ensure that transnational corporations
respected acquired rights and international labour con-
ventions.
1.6. Lastly, in its Opinion  of  20 September 1990 ()
on the Commission Communication to the Council
accompanied by two proposals for Council Decisions
relating to an action programme to promote the devel-
opment  of  the' European audiovisual industry 
Media' 1991- 1995 (8), the Committee ~dopted the fol-
lowing stance: ' Different kinds  of  programme-makers
with varying legal status, i,e, both public- and private-
sector suppliers, can coexist in democratic and socially
responsible ways, thereby laying the foundation for
cultural pluralism, However, it must be ensured that
all such entities  of  whatever kind respect the principle
of  free expression  of  opinion for all social groups, All
available means must be used to combat the develop-
ment  of  monopoly-type structures in the record, cassette
and film distribution business which hinder or even
prevent free trade in these media articles
1.7, In parallel to the Committee s own observations
the European Parliament's Resolution A3-0153/92 corr.
on media concentration and diversity  of  opinions of
16 September 1992 makes important proposals on the
need for Community action,. In particular, the Com-
mittee would endorse the calls for:
the drafting  of  a charter for European non-profit-
making broadcasting organizations, i.e, public
broadcasting organizations, broadcasting cooperat-
ives and public-access channels;
the protection and safeguarding  of  Europe s cultural
heritage and cultural output;
the regulation  of  short reporting .on events  of  general
interest, with a corresponding right  of  news access;
the formulation  of  a Media Code designed to main-
tain professional ethics (see Point 5);
OJ  No C 332, 31. 12. 1990, p. 174.
OJ  No C 127, 23. 5. 1990, p. 13, .S-q 
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- a Commission p:roposal fo:r a Eu:ropean f:ramewo:rk
Di:rective safegua:rding jou:rnalistic and edito:rial
independence in all media;
- a p:roposal fo:r effective measu:res to combat o:r
:rest:rict concent:ration in the media; and
the establishment of an independent Eu:ropean
Media Council.
2, Gist of the Commission G:reen Pape:r
1. In the light of the basic app:roach adopted in the
EEC T:reaty and, consequently, in the G:reen Pape:r
the Commission s concent:ration on the c:reation of a
smoothly functioning inte:rnal ma:rket fo:r :radio and
television is unde:rstandable. Neve:rtheless, in view of
the fact that the audiovisual media and the information
policy associated with thei:r use constitute imponant
bases fo:r Eu:rope s . social and democ:ratic development
the Committee thinks that the safegua:rding of plu:ralism
and of the f:reedom and va:riety of the opinions
exp:ressed in those media should :receive at least the
same deg:ree of attention. Mo:reove:r, no account is taken
of the :role of the p:ress in this context-eithe:r as a
co:r:rective O:r stimulant to concent:ration p:rocesses in the
audiovisual secto:r, As long as media-policy decisions
at eithe:r na.tiona:I o:r  Community level-entail the :risk
of the c:reation of opinion-fo:rming canels, Eu:ropean
development could be th:reatened, The Committee
would st:ress the impo:rtance of safegua:rding basic :rights
in the Community as the Community o:rgans, especially
the Cou:rt of Justice, have :repeatedly :recognized,
2, The G:reen Pape:r makes specific :refe:rence to
Eu:ropean Pa:rliament Resolutions and to the wo:rk of
the Council of Eu:rope: Howeve:r, the Committee, too
has al:ready adopted a stance on the p:roblem of concen"
t:ration in the media, pa:rticula:rly in its Opinions on
television without f:rontie:rs. The failu:re to take note
of ESC comments on this subject is a fundamental
sho:rtcoming of the G:reen Pape:r; the final ve:rsion of
the Commission document should take account of the
Committee s extensive p:repa:rato:ry wo:rk, p:roposals
and ideas on this topic,
2'3, The Commission s pu:rpose in publishing the
G:reen Pape:r is to p:resent an initial assessment of the
need fo:r Community action on concent:ration in the
media (television, :radio p:ress) and of va:rious
app:roaches which the Commission might adopt once
it has asce:rtained the views of the pa:rties conce:rned,
2.4, On the basis of its analysis of the diffe:rent
national regulations and measu:res gove:rning plu:ralism
and media concent:ration, the Commission has :reached
the following conclusions:
2.4,1. . P:rotection of plu:ralism as such is p:rima:rily a
matte:r fo:r the Membe:r States. In wo:rking towa:rds its
objectives and exe:rcising its powe:rs, the Community
must, howeve:r, ensu:re that plu:ralism is not adve:rsely
affected by its activities and the way it exe:rcise its
powe:rs. In this :respect, the Commission sees no need
fo:r special action at Community level to safegua:rd
plu:ralism, since national a:r:rangements fo:r p:rotecting
plu:ralism can, in p:rinciple, also be applied to situations
with a Community dimension.
2. This capacity of the Membe:r States to safe-
gua:rd plu:ralism th:rough a national :regulato:ry f:rame-
wo:rk fo:r me:rge:rs may, howeve:r, lead to disc:repancies
within the f:rontie:r-f:ree a:rea constituted by the Com-
mimity. This is pa:rticula:rly t:rue in the case of national
p:rovisions which a:re designed eithe:r to limit maximum
holdings in media companies O:r to p:revent cont:rol of,
o:r holdings in, seve:ral media companies.
2.4.3, Such national :regulations may, at least poten-
tially, impact upon the functioning of the f:rontie:r-f:ree
sin1?;le ma:rket:
- a Membe:r State could possibly :rest:rict the f:reedom
to b:roadcast of :radio stations in the event of genuine
ci:rcumvention of one of these laws,
the establishment of media companies in anothe:r
Membe:r State could be limited,
:rest:rictions and disto:rtions of competition could be
int:roduced,
unce:rtainty as to the law, ha:rmful to the competi-
tiveness of companies, could :result f:rom dive:rging
views on what constitutes 'ci:rcumvention
such legal p:rovisions limit access to the activities
and to the owne:rship of the media, instead of facilit-
ating aCcess so as to pe:rmit the establishment of
a single ma:rket and give media companies that
competitiveness which plu:ralism :requi:res,
2.4.4, Owne:rship :rest:rictions causing such effects a:re
not necessa:rily incompatible with Community law
because they help to gua:rantee o:r safegua:rd plu:ralism,
Consequently, they cannot be :replaced just by applying
gene:ral competition law and in panicula:r, at Com-
munity level, the me:rge:r cont:rol :regulation.
2.4.5. The Commission p:roposes the th:ree following
options fo:rpossible Community action:
Doing nothing
II. P:roposing a :recommendation to enhance t:rans-
pa:rency;
III. P:roposing the ha:rmonization. of national :rest:ric-
tions on media owne:rship by
a) a Council Di:rective, O:r... 
~O 
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b) a Council Regulation, or
c) a directive or a regulation together with an
independent committee.
The Commission does not currently have a particular
preference for anyone of these options and remains
open to alternative suggestions,
3. General comments
1. The Committee thinks that the Commission
should take account of the following points in the
course of further discussion:
a) The Green Paper s analysis of the situation in the
Member States concludes that the existence of dis-
parate anti-trust provisions in respect of the media
impedes the operation of the single market in this
sector and. that Community action is therefore
necessary, The Committee recognizes that the
obstacles to the operation of the single market cre-
ated by different national provisions (restriction/
distortion of competition, limitation of the freedom
to provide services and the right of establishment,
legal uncertainty) must be removed so as to enable
enterprises to enjoy both the benefits of the single
market and equal opportunities for development
within the Ec.But the Commission sees no need
for Community legislation to safeguard pluralism
and the freedom of opinion since, on the one hand,
the EC Treaty makes the Member States responsible
for ensuring pluralism and, on the other, the differ-
ent national rules on this subject ostensibly provide
adequate guarantees.
b) For .the Committee, this conclusion represents an
oversimplification, The Commission itself acknowl-
edges that, whilst EC competition law can help
in maintaining pluralism, it is not the appropriate
instrument for this task. Moreover, the mere
removal of legal restrictions during the approval
procedure for broadcasters could reduce pluralism,
The safeguarding of pluralism and freedom of opin"
ion in programmes essentially depends on rules
designed to prevent media concentration processes
which could lead to monopoly-type mergers. The
more certain large media extend their dominance
over European countrieS, the fewer the oppor-
tunities for smaller suppliers to maintain alternative
programme production.
c) Even if the Community s power is limited to the
establishment of the internal market, there can be
no doubt that, in the case ofthe media, such market
mechanisms have a major influence on the safe-
guarding of pluralism in the supply of programmes
--and, consequently, the freedom and variety of
opinions, The Committee therefore feels it would
be wrong for the Community to avoid taking action
to maintain pluralism, Such action should, ac:cord"
ingly, define the limits to media concentration so
as to protect pluralism in the EC against media
companies which dominate entire sectors of opin"
ion-forming activity in certain regions. Whilst the
economic health and competitiveness of businesses
may be preconditions for pluralism, they do not
automatically increase it and may even lead to a
reduction if the market is controlled by a single
company,
d) Rules on national and trans-national media com-
panies which achieve monopoly-type dominance of
broad sectors in certain countries are considered by
the Committee to be necessary; theEC Directive
cannot concentrate exclusively on the removal of
barriers to market access - Community legislation
must also set precise limits to media-specific concen-
tration, The same applies to State-run television and
r~dio organizations which dominate the market by
virtue ofthe size, On the other hand, public broad-
casting companies, whose independence from
government interference is guaranteed by the public
bodies controlling them, can significantly help to
safeguard the freedom of opinion and information
and t~us to ensure pluralism,
e) It is necessary to inttoduce legislation governing
access to satellite frequencies which allow unrestric-
ted broadcasting to Europe, 
f) A media committee made up of members of the
European Parliament and the ESC and including
independent experts and representatives of interest-
ed social groupings should be set up to advise the
Commission,
g) The Committee thinks that pluralism should also
be safeguarded by legal provisions in other areas,
Requirements must therefore be laid down in
respect of minimum democratic standards in Euro-
pean television and radio stations and the press
(safeguarding of ' internal' broadcasting' and press
freedom through cooperation, participation and the
prohibition of censures). Thus, in its Milan Declar-
ation of 5 March 1993, the European Group of the
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) stated:
But apart from measures aimed at safeguarding
pluralism in the media in general, there is a need
for securing pluralism inside the publishing houses
and broadcasting stations There is the need to
secure editorial independence, The editorial staff
detains (sic) the moral and intellectual capital of
publishing houses and broadcasting stations , The
Milan Declaration also sets out minimum standards
of editorial independence for all European media.10, 11. 93 Official Journal of the European .Communities No C 304/21
2. The Committee therefore urges the Commission
to take steps to ensure that ownership conditions in the
press and electronic media sector are made completely
public by requiring transparency in finan~ial trans.
actions and full disclosure of worldwide company hold-
ings, cross-holdings and concealed third-party holdings,
Such transparency must be compelled by specific Com-
munity legislative provisions as a precondition of legal
protection for freedom of opinion and information,
3.3, In view of the importance of the media for a
democratic, pluralistic social order in the Community,
it is not sufficient to monitor concentration processes
and take action to prevent any adverse consequences
for freedom of information and cultural diversity. Con-
sideration should therefore be given to die creation of .
a European Media Council as a self-regulatOry body
for the sector, which could deal with such developments
and suggestions for improving European media policy.
3.4, The ESC would point to the pre-eminent import-
ance attaching to Community regulations, while paying
due regard to the subsidiarity principle, It is, howev~r
essential that-in view of the technological possibilities
(satellite broadcasting)-the Community s basic media
rules should also be applied in non-member countries,
The Commission should initiate negotiations on such
cooperation without delay, 
4. ESC answers to the Commission s questions
1.  Question 
How great is the need for action, in particular with
regard to:
restrictions on ownership;
restrictive effects;
specific restrictions in respect of multi-media and
mono-media aspects?
There are sufficient well-known cases which establish
the need for action. Legal provisions governing
approval conditions have not always been adequately
observed; thus, the simultaneous ownership of tele-
vision stations, TV and radio weeklies and newspapers
which is prohibited in the US, for examplC""-has
been exploited by media enterprises to attack or mar-
ginalize rival programme producers and gain competi-
tive advantages, The trade in exclusive rights to infor-
mation is expanding and could ultimately pose a threat
to freedom of information. There is also a need to
prevent restriction . on pluralism arising from inter-
national agreements with third countries which occupy
channels and frequencies that have already been assig-
ned to local and regional TV stations in the Com-
munity, thereby limiting or reducing their scope for
broadcasting.
2,  Question 
Are the needs identified of sufficient importance, in the
light of Community objectives, to require action in the
media industry and, if so, when should such action be
taken?
Action in the media sector' thatis designed to eliminate
restrictive effects ,~. which might affect the implemen-
tation of the single market in the media industry' must
also take account of the impact of unrestricted market
dominance on pluralism and the variety of opinions
and provide for specific Community rules covering the
transparency of media companies and limiting media
concentration. The Committee therefore proposes rapid
Community action with the aim of:
defining standard EC-wide concentration rules for
the print and electronic media,
setting minimum democratic standards to ensure
internal' broadcasting and press freedom in the
interests of safeguarding the variety of opinions and
freedom of information. The right to report 
cultural and sporting events (even of a commercial
nature) must also be guaranteed-and must pre-
clude unjustifi~d interference by commercial inter-
ests;
making public the advertising revenue of all broad-
casters.
4.3,  Question 
How effective, in the light of Community objectives
would action taken solely at Member State level be?
Whilst national measures may be appropriate, Com-
munity action is essential to prevent further media
concentration and safeguard pluralism,
4.4,  Question 
What are the views of interested parties on the content
of a possible harmonization instrument as envisaged
above, and in particular on the two variants for its
scope, on the use of the real audience as a basis for
setting thresholds, on the demarcation of distribution
areas, on any other possible references, and on ways of
defining the concept of controller?
4.4,1. As regards the scope of the Green Paper
(Chapter V, 1, C), the Committee agrees that restric-
tions deriving from pluralism rules cannot relate to
programme content, Whilst provisions designed to
ensure variety of opinions and freedom of information-. (,?..-
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6.  Question  in broadcasting are indispensable, their codification and
monitoring must continue to be regulated nationally.
Yet, even if their partial effectiveness were established,
there would be no guarantee of genuine pluralism since
the lifting of national restrictions on media ownership
in the internal market would favour further expansion
by international media corporations whose interests
and programme policies are not guided by pluralist
ideals, There is now .sufficient evidence to show that
far from increasing pluralism, commercially-orientated
broadcasting policy simply leads to more of the same,
e. merely the plural rather than pluralism,
4.4,2. The Committee therefore welcomes' the Green
Paper s consideration of the balance to be struck
between ensuring diversity and facilitating market
access when harmoni~ing national legislation in the
internal market and would again stress the need for
anti-concentration rules for media enterprises above a
certain si~e.
It would make the following specific proposals:
In view of the existence of international multi-media
corporations, ownership restriCtions must also be
introduced in respect of the press.
Neither media nor non-media enterprises must be
allowed to dominate the market in several media
sectors (television, radio, press) in one or more
national markets; similarly, no such enterprise that
already controls a national media sector must be
allowed to extend its market dominance,
Media or non-media companies already dominating
the market in one national media sector should not
be allowed to acquire a majority holding' in media
companies elsewhere in the Community,
Before a media company that is already active in
one media sector is allowed to operate in another
media sector, all its holdings and cross-ownership
arrangements must be disclosed in full.
5.  Question 
What would be the advantage of action to promote
transparency which' would he separate from a harmoni-
~ation instrument? 
For the reasons already stated, the Committee sees little
point in measures to ensure the transparency of all
media companies il,1 the absence of action to control
media concentration and pluralism,
How desirable would it be, regardless of the ' pro.
cedural' aspects of a possible harmonization instru-
ment, . to set up a body with competence for media
concentration?
In accordance with the European Parliament s Resol-
ution of 16 September 1992, it seems advisable to set
up a European Media Councilor media arbitration
centre composed of independent experts and represen-
tatives of relevant social and cultural interest groups.
This would have the task of analy~ing concentration
processes and advising Parliament and the Commission
on all EC media questions.
7,  Options
No specific action:
The Committee shares the views of the European
Parliament with regard to media concentration,
and also finds the Green Paper s objections to this
approach more convincing. Moreover, the policies
pursued by supranational media concerns can no
longer be adequately influenced by national legis-
lation. The Committee therefore cannOt endorse
Option I.
II. Action relating to transparency:
The Committee regards such an isolated Com-
mission proposal to the Member States, which
would be independent of action to harmoni~e
national restrictions on media holdings, as inad-
equate (see 4.5) and consequently rejects it.
III, Action to harmoni~e laws:
Bearing in mind, in particular, the comments on
Question 4 concerning the consequences for plural-
ism, theESC endorses, in principle, the introduction
of legal provisions by means of a directive and
thinks that approximation on the basis of a regu-
lation would be comparatively inflexible. Sub-
option C, on the other hand, would appear to be
both reasonable and effective.
5, Foundations of a media code
1. The problems of growing media concentration
and the increasing commerciali~ation and violence of
many TV programmes, which are becoming apparent
in the context of the Green Paper s topic and are not
confined to Europe, require more fundamental .dis-
. cussion, All interested parties should therefore consider
the establishment of a European media code which, in,,3-
10, 11, 93 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 304/23
addition to the control of ,media company power
should provide for the analysis of consumer require-
ments, bearing in mind, in particular, the maintenance
and safeguarding of the freedom of information and
opinions, the protection of minors against violent and
pornographic programmes and their restriction on
grounds of human-particularly female-dignity and
the prohibition of the glorification of war,
2, The Committee has already laid the foundations
for such a European media code in earlier Opinions:
The increase in the range of media now coming on to the market necessitates consumer-policy
measures if the consumer is not unwittingly 
become 'the phiything of those who exercise a direct
influence on the media and on the information
disseminated thereby. Consumer education can help
the consumer make responsible use of media ser-
vices, Consideration should be given to whether
consumer organizations might not themselves be
able to help directly in this task via their own
consumer education programmes,
(ESC Opinion of 25 September 1985 on the Green
Paper on the establishment of the common market
for broadcasting, especially by satellite and cable,
There is therefore a possible danger that an ever-
increasing, proportion of' so-called popular pro-
grammes (feature films, variety programmes
games) will be offered to the public once the com-
mon broadcasting market, as advocated by the
Green Paper, has been established, Because of the
high audience ratings they command, such pro-
grammes are particularly profitable from a commer-
cial point of view, The result might well be stan-
dardization incompatible with the objectives of the
Green Paper rather than a genuine diversification
of programmes.' (ibidem 4.4,
Hence the case for setting limits to the free play of
competition in radio and television broadcasting
through the imposition of European-wide quality
standards, ,For the time being, however, existing
national quality standards should be retained and
supported.' (ibidem 4,
In the field of 'public order' the Community should
introduce provisions to harmonize the necessary
basic measures in the interests of:
protecting minors in particular against por-
nography and the glorification of violence and
armed conflict,
protecting individuals against misrepresentation
(right of reply).' (ibidem 5.4.
The. Committee endorses the provisions with
regard to the protection of children and young
persons. It considers that the rules of conduct for
this purpose should be accompanied and supported
by systematic consumer education at national level
so that young people constantly exposed to broad~
casting may learn to develop a critical awareness of
both programmes and advertisements,
(ESC Opinion of 1 July 1987 on the proposal for a
Council Directive on the coordination of certain
provisions laid down by law, regulation or adminis-
trative action in Member States concerning the pur-
suit of broadcasting activities -Article 15, 2,25,
5.3, In October 1989, the Council adopted the Direc-
tive on Television without Frontiers, which set out
important guidelines, In it, the Council:
affirmed the importance of broadcasting for the
development of culture and the free formation of
opinions in conditions safeguarding pluralism and
equality of opportunity,
recognized the need to consolidate the common
broad framework of regulation, notably as regards
the responsibilities of the broadcaster not to present
indecent, violent or racist material; to reserve for
European works a majority proportion of their
transmission time; to abide by general standards on
the duration, presentation, form and insertion of
advertisements; to monitor the content and quality
of advertising, with particular reference to infor-
mation, education and consumer protection,
5.4, In its Additional Opinion on 20 December 1989
on a fresh boost for culture in the European Com-
munity, the ESC commented on the Convention as
follows:
Culture is seen as a dynamic, evolutive enrichment
of daily life. The European Community dimension
has and can continue significantly to contribute to
this, not in any perceived 'identikit' fashion , but
through the harmony upon which diversity thrives
through increased contact, comparison and mixing,
and the identification both of different cultural tra-
ditions and of common uniting principles, of mutual
understanding and the elimination of prejudices
between peoples, The European 'cultural model' is
not all-exclusive, still less a ' melting pot' but rather
a multi-various, multi-ethnical plurality of culture
the sum total of which enriches each individual
culture. The European 'cultural model' serves not
as a 'fortress' but as an open springboard towards
other cultures both throughout the Community and
throughout the world.' (1.4,- ~4- -
Official Journal of the European Communities 10. 11. 93
No C 304/24
5.5: The following sections of this Opinion contain
a detailed examination of the 'cultural aspects of media
policy , In a further Opinion of 20 Septembe.r 1990 on
an action programme to promote the development of
the European audiovisual industry- Media' 1991.
1995, the ESC noted:
In relation to people media policy has a variety of
effects, responsibilities and democratic, social and
cultural duties. We are talking not only of a con-
stantly expanding market with turnOver measured
in thousands of millions and hundreds of thousands
of employees, but more importantly about the main.
tenance and promotion of Europe s historical ident-
ity.' (3,7.3,
Done at Brussels, 22 September 1993,
Different kinds of prQgfamme makers with varying
legal status, Le, both public and private sector sup-
pliers, can coexist in democratic and socially respon-
sible' ways, thereby laying the foundation for cul-
tural pluralism. However, it must be ensured that
all such entities of whatever kind respect the prin-
ciple of free expression of opinion for all social
groups.' (3,
6, Conclusion
The Commission is asked to consider the foregoing
points and proposals with a view to ensuring that
human dignity in a free, democratic society is the focal
point of future developments in the European media
market.
The Chairman
of the Economic and Social Committee
Susanne TIEMANN- 6
..;;-
Annex 6
Disparities between national rules on media ownership
The Green Paper showed that there were considerable disparities between the specific
national laws and regulations limiting o"'91ership of the media for reasons relating to
pluralism, Such disparities exist at various levels, particularly as regards the  type of
restriction (limits on cumulation of mono media or multimedia ownership, limits on the
maximum stake in a channel, restrictions as regards the type of person controlling the
medium), the  scope of the restrictions on media ownership (some national rules cover
monomedia press concentration, others simply monomedia television, while others also
cover multimedia ownership), the  dezree of constraint (the number of licences that can be
held concurrently and the shareholding thresholds vary), and the  means .of applying the
restrictions (e.g. some national rules distinguish between satellite and terrestrial television,
general-interest and specialized or news-only television, and national and regional
television), The examples below illustrate these disparities but must be interpreted with
caution since there may have been recent changes to the legislation and the simplified
presentation precludes any nuances or detailed explanation.
Example No 1. Disparities between the four types of provision relating to media
ownership (defined in the introduction)
IRL
Monomedia press
restrictions
Monomedia TV or radio
restrictions
Multimedia restrictions
Maximwn sharebolding in a
TV station
Disqualified penons
Example No 2 Disparities between the rules limiting an operator s shareholding in a
television channel (irrespective of the number of channels already controlled by that
operator)
- In Italy and the United Kingdom there is no limit of this type.
- In Germany and France, a persons maximum shareholding in a television channel must
stay below 50%.
- In Spain, Greece and Portugal, an operator s maximum shareholding ina television
channel is limited to 25%.
Example No 3 Disparities between the rules limiting the number of television channels
which may be held by a single person
- In the United Kingdom, there is no limit in the case of satellite channels.
- In Italy, the maximum number is three channels.
- In Germany, France (satellite channels) and the United Kingdom (Channel
maximum number is two. channels.
- In Spain and France (terrestrial channels), the maximum number is one channel.
3), the6b 
Examnle No 4 Disparities between the rules limiting monomedia press concentration
(acquisition of control of one press enterprise by another)
- In France and Italy, the merger of two press enterprises is prohibited if their newspaper
circulation exceeds a certain threshold (France: 30%; Italy: 20%).
In the United Kingdom and Germany, there are no such specific thresholds. There are
only thresholds which trigger an obligation to notifY and an examination by the
competition authorities,
- In the other Member States, there is no specific limit.
Example No 5. Disparities between the specific rules limiting multimedia concentration
by preventing the control of a television channel by a press
enterprise
- Some rules prohibit a press enterprise from controlling a television channel if the
newspaper circulation or market share exceeds a certain threshold, The threshold varies
according to the Member State: Netherlands 25%, Italy 16%, France 20% (only applies
if the newspaper proprietor already controls a radio station or cab~e network). 
- In the United Kingdom, ilTespective of the circulation threshold, a newspaper proprietor
may only hold 20% of the shares in Channel 3 or ChannelS,
- In the United Kingdom, in the case of satellite channel~, there is no limit, nor in France if
the newspaper owner does not own a radio station or a cable network.
Example No 6. Disparities between the rules relating to disqualified persons (the
impossibility for certain categories of person, body or enterprise
to control a television channel)
- government, public enterprises and local authorities: B, D, I, NL, P, UK;
- political bodies: B, D, P, UK;
- religious bodies: UK;
- advertising agencies: UK.